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Abstract 
In recent years, the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been promoted as 
a potential mechanism for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
multilateral approach has the potential to gain international favour over what has 
become traditional practice – the indigenous development and control of nuclear 
facilities. This thesis explores the way in which four states have responded to the 
revived attention on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, within the 
framework of the norm life cycle. The varying levels of support reflect broader 
international opinion on this issue, as many developing states remain concerned that 
they may be required to forgo not only the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear 
energy, but also the prospective economic and technological benefits of indigenous 
development in order to participate. However, as the risk of further proliferation and 
nuclear terrorism comes to the fore of international agendas, facilitating multilateral 
control of the most sensitive aspects of peaceful nuclear energy may be the key to 
strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the 21st century. 
 
Introduction 
After a period of unpopularity following the reactor meltdowns at Three Mile Island in 
1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, international interest in nuclear energy has been 
revitalised over the last decade, a “nuclear renaissance” that is driven by a number of 
different factors.1 For countries with increasing populations, the subsequent 
augmentation of energy demand is problematic, and nuclear power can seem like a 
good solution. Nuclear power is a relatively reliable source of energy, particularly when 
                                                 
1
 Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear Energy: Rebirth of Resuscitation?" Carnegie Endowment for Peace, March 
2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear_energy_rebirth_resuscitation.pdf. John Deutch 
(Co-Chair), Ernest J. Moniz (Co-Chair), Stephen Ansolabehere, Michael Driscoll, Paul E. Gray, John P. 
Holdren, Paul L. Joskow, Richard K. Lester, and Neil E. Todreas, "The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study". (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy, 2003), 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/. 
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compared with hydro or solar sources that are weather-dependent and are not viable 
options in all geographic areas. Recent concerns regarding human-accelerated climate 
change increase the appeal of nuclear power, as reactors emit a low level of greenhouse 
gases. Additionally, developing countries may equate the adoption of nuclear power 
with emergence into the ‘developed’ world. Nuclear energy is a technologically 
advanced venture that is difficult to achieve without assistance; therefore, establishing a 
nuclear power programme may be a source of great national pride. However, concern 
about the potential for a global expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities parallels the 
revival in interest in nuclear power, for several reasons. The ability of states to 
adequately manage the safety and security of sensitive nuclear materials, technologies, 
and facilities; the potential for the development of latent nuclear capabilities that may 
escalate existing international security tensions; and the link between the development 
of civilian nuclear energy programmes and military nuclear activities contribute to 
international anxieties on this matter. These concerns have sparked renewed 
international interest in multilateral nuclear approaches. This thesis explores the extent 
to which multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle constitute an emerging norm 
– a move away from the traditionally accepted practice of allowing individual states to 
indigenously engage in the full range of fuel cycle activities to a new practices of 
international ownership and management, in the interests of global security. 
 
The ongoing and seemingly intractable situations in Iran and North Korea illustrate the 
worst-case scenario for the non-proliferation regime: a state’s engagement in peaceful 
nuclear activities verges on straying beyond its civilian boundaries, increasingly 
approaching to the development of a usable nuclear weapon. Unlike North Korea, it is 
 3 
unclear from the open literature whether Iran’s activities have yet to definitively cross 
the military line; but if it has not yet done so, the risk that it will is ever-increasing and 
demonstrates the root problem of the spread of peaceful nuclear technology: its dual-
use nature. 
 
In recent years, two major issues have surfaced for the global nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The first has been an ongoing issue since the beginning of the nuclear age – the 
dual-use nature of nuclear technology. That some parts of the nuclear fuel cycle can be 
applied in both civilian and military realms presents a serious threat to global non-
proliferation efforts. It is no secret that a state can cultivate a nuclear weapons 
programme from the knowledge and physical components of a civilian nuclear energy 
programme. Civilian nuclear programmes have been used to disguise weapons research 
and development in a long list of states, including Argentina, Brazil, France, India, 
Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan.2 In fact, civilian 
applications of nuclear energy arose out of nuclear weapons research and development 
conducted by the Manhattan Project in the 1940s.3 As is evident from past events, 
political will is often the only barrier between peaceful nuclear activities and the 
development of nuclear weapons. Proliferation decisions can be motivated by a desire 
to increase international power and prestige, or military, security or domestic political 
incentives.4 Other considerations, such as the time, finances, and the level of deception 
                                                 
2
 Man-Sung Yim, "Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power," Progress in 
Nuclear Energy 482006), 507.  
3
 Ibid., 505.  
4
 Ibid., 508. See also S. M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, Illinois: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 11-12. Wyn Q. Bowen and International Institute for Strategic 
Studies., Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 
for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). 
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required to go down a proliferation path, contribute to the political decision to pursue or 
refrain from nuclear weapons development.5  
 
 
Figure 1. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle.6 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Yim, "Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power," 508. J. D. L. Moore, 
South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions in the 
Context of International Non-Proliferation Policies (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan 
Press, 1987), 128-29. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Near-Nuclear Countries and 
the NPT (Stockholm and New York: Almqvist & Wiksell; Humanities Press, 1972), 22-3. Etel Solingen, 
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
6
 Reprinted with permission from the World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf03.html Accessed 12 March 2008. 
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As shown in Figure 1, the nuclear fuel cycle is the process by which natural uranium is 
processed, used to produce electricity in a nuclear reactor, and eventually disposed of as 
nuclear waste. Uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel are the two 
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that present the greatest proliferation risk. The 
commonality between the two is fissile material; uranium or plutonium is used to create 
a chain reaction of energy that can power the reactors in nuclear power plants as well as 
nuclear weapons. Natural uranium contains about 0.7% of the fissile isotope Uranium-
235 (U-235); the rest is non-fissile Uranium-238 (U-238). Fuel for a nuclear reactor 
requires between 3.5% and 5% U-235, also known as low-enriched uranium (LEU). 
Weapons-grade uranium, or highly enriched uranium (HEU), must be enriched to at 
least 90% to guarantee a high explosive yield. A bomb containing uranium enriched to 
any level above 50% would still have a large yield.7 The technology used for enriching 
uranium, or increasing the proportion of U-235, is the same for both weapons and 
reactor fuel. Thus, centrifuges in nuclear facilities that enrich uranium for nuclear 
power can also be used to create weapons-grade material. 
 
Plutonium is a reactor-made substance that results from reprocessing used uranium fuel 
in nuclear reactors. Plutonium can also be used in a nuclear weapon, and in much 
smaller amounts than uranium - 2-6 kilograms (kg) of high-grade plutonium compared 
with 6-20kg of HEU. The amounts of fissile material required in the pits of modern 
implosion nuclear weapons are smaller still.8 The acquisition of plutonium is less 
                                                 
7
 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 4-11. Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: the 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 417-20. Mark Fitzpatrick and 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes 
(Oxford: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 1, 19. 
8
 Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium 
Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington D.C.: National Resources Defence Council, 
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difficult than HEU, because it comes from the reprocessing of spent fuel, and making it 
a natural part of a closed fuel cycle.9 Many states use reprocessing because some of the 
uranium contained in the waste can be reused in Mixed Oxide (MOX) reactor fuel, a 
process sometimes referred to as ‘recycling’. China, France, Japan, Russia, the UK and 
the US all have stockpiles of reprocessed plutonium that have the potential to be used in 
weapons, radiological or “dirty” bombs, or as a terrorist target. According to a 1997 US 
Department of Energy (DOE) Report, almost any combination of plutonium isotopes 
can be used to make a nuclear weapon: 
“…reactor grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated 
proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states… At the lowest level of 
sophistication, a potential proliferating state or sub-national group using designs and 
technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons 
could build a nuclear weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have an 
assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly 
higher than that). At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states 
such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons 
from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other 
characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapon-grade 
plutonium.”10 
 
Due to the ability to utilize parts of a civilian fuel cycle for military purposes, a state 
that is engaged in uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing as part of its civilian 
                                                                                                                                              
1995), 5-6. For an overview of the types of nuclear weapons see Donald MacKenzie and Graham 
Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," The American 
Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1 (1995), 50-52.; Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of 
Nuclear Weapons, 9-12. 
9
 In a closed fuel cycle, spent fuel is reprocessed, separating uranium and plutonium from the remaining 
waste. Plutonium from nuclear reactor waste cannot be used for an advanced nuclear weapon without the 
chemical separation of weapons-usable plutonium-239 isotopes from the less stable plutonium-240 
isotopes. However, it could still be used in a radiological weapon. In an open, or ‘once-through’ fuel 
cycle, all spent fuel is disposed as waste. See Deutch et al, "The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Near-Nuclear 
Countries and the NPT, 6. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 
1989-1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 420-22. Institute for Energy and Environmental 
Research, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Last updated July 2005, 
http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/pu-props.html. Accessed 17 April 2008. 
10
 International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Developing the 
technical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and 
fissile materials," (2007), 117. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf. Accessed 10 
June 2008. 
 7 
nuclear energy programme also has a ‘latent capacity’ for nuclear weapons 
development, which presents a serious challenge to non-proliferation efforts. A full fuel 
cycle civilian programme requires many common elements to a military weapons 
programme, such as uranium deposits, metallurgists, chemical engineers, nuclear 
engineers, physicists, chemists, electronic and explosive specialists, and electricity 
production capacity.11 The availability of dual-use materials and knowledge provides an 
opportunity for states to “go nuclear” very quickly, if domestic leadership deemed it 
beneficial to do so, due to international security factors. Thus, the dual-use nature of the 
materials and technology involved in producing electricity from atomic energy is a 
major weakness for the non-proliferation regime. 
 
In addition to the dual-use problem, a second major challenge to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime has come to the fore as the extent of Iran’s nuclear activities has 
become apparent. Although the primary function of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as indicated in its title, is to prevent the further spread of 
nuclear weapons, it simultaneously introduces the right to access nuclear power for 
states that agree to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes. Article IV of the NPT states 
that all Parties have an “inalienable right” to research, produce, and use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes, and in addition, to participate in the full exchange of 
“equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy”.12 In addition to electricity generation, nuclear energy has many 
                                                 
11
 Jo Dong-Joon and Gartzke Erik, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 2007), 173. 
12
 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Treaty Series: Treaties and International 
Agreements Registered or Filed or Recorded at the Secretariat of the United Nations. Vienna: 1970. 
Article IV. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/  
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peaceful scientific applications, including in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and 
water resource management.13  
 
The deliberate ambiguity in the text of the NPT, which was required to satisfy the 
negotiating parties at the time of negotiation, has become problematic for the present-
day debate on the obligations and rights of States Parties. Given the significant changes 
in the international security environment since the 1970s, former IAEA Director 
General Mohamed ElBaradei has stated the need to regard the treaty “as part of a 
living, dynamic regime”.14 New security challenges, including the development of 
number of nuclear-armed states outside the NPT regime, need to be taken into account 
in addition to the rights afforded to States Parties regarding nuclear energy. Article IV 
states that peaceful nuclear energy must be used in conformity with Articles I and II.15 
Article I forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to any recipient by a nuclear weapon 
state (NWS) and the assistance or encouragement of any non-nuclear weapon state 
(NNWS) to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.16 Article 
II prohibits NNWS from receiving nuclear weapons, and from asking for assistance to 
manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.17  
 
Some states believe that the “inalienable right” to nuclear technology is an 
unconditional entitlement – that any state may choose to adopt nuclear energy as a 
source of electricity in their territory, and subsequently technical assistance will be 
                                                 
13
 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications", 
http://www-naweb.iaea.org/na/index.html. Accessed 14 March 2008. 
14
 Xinjun Zhang, "The Riddle of 'Inalienable Right' in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity," Chinese Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 (November 
1, 2006 2006), 650.  
15
 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", 1970. Article IV 
16
 Ibid. Article I  
17
 Ibid. Article II  
 9 
given to them.18 In the 1980s, the representative of France on the first IAEA Board of 
Governors, Bertrand Goldschmidt, concluded that restrictions on certain nuclear 
activities would be incompatible with the Treaty itself.19 Former director of the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Frank Barnaby agreed with 
this assessment, arguing that an NPT Party was only forbidden from creating a fully 
assembled nuclear weapon, including fissile material, and thus all other non-nuclear 
components could be constructed without being in noncompliance.20 Conversely, 
Leonard S. Spector asserted that the commitment made by Parties in signing the NPT to 
refrain from manufacturing weapons includes “all related development, component 
fabrication, and testing”.21  
 
In light of the clandestine nuclear weapons development, the security breaches of 
nuclear facilities, and the nuclear safety events that the international community has 
since witnessed, the strictly legal interpretation of Article IV articulated by 
Goldschmidt and Barnaby is now held largely by developing states.22 For the most part, 
experts and developed states accept that unrestricted access to all nuclear technologies 
                                                 
18
 "Statement by H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of 
the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran", (presented at the Forty-Eighth Regular Session of the General 
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September 2004). 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Statements/index.html . "Statement by Ambassador 
Antonio Guerreiro, Permanent Representative of Brazil", (presented at the Fifty-Second Session of the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September-October 2008). 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/Statements/index.html  
19
 Goldschmidt Bertrand, "A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies," International Security 2, 
no. 1 1977), 80. 
20
 Frank Barnaby, "Can Nuclear-weapon Proliferation Be Prevented?" Bulletin of Peace Proposals 8, no. 
1 (1977), Available from http://sdi.sagepub.com. Accessed 29 July 2009. 
21
 Zhang, "The Riddle of 'Inalienable Right' in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity," 653.  
22
 Many developing states see the push by NWS for increasing restrictions on the Article IV rights of 
NNWS as hypocritical, given the lack of progress made on nuclear disarmament. In addition, some 
NNWS are concern that if ‘good behaviour’ becomes a prerequisite for technical cooperation, and the 
international community becomes suspicious that a state might have a hidden military agenda for its 
peaceful nuclear technology and materials, then the full exchange of science may be denied in the 
interests of international security. 
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would undermine effective non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security 
measures.23 The increased spread of not only nuclear technology, but nuclear know-
how, since the NPT entered into force has reduced the economic and technological 
barriers that previously separated peaceful and military nuclear programmes more 
distinctly.24 The issue of nuclear terrorism is a compounding factor, adding to an 
already complex nuclear equation. 
 
Since the 2002 public revelation of the extent of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, 
Iranian officials have been persistent in their defence that Article IV allows them to 
carry out such activities, as they are “transparent, peaceful and under the watchful eyes 
of IAEA inspectors”.25 Despite being rich in natural resources, such as oil and gas, 
which could provide a source of electricity, Iran wishes to develop nuclear energy. This 
in itself is less of a concern to the international community than the fact that Iran also 
wants to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle. On one hand, it is understandable that they 
would not want to be reliant on foreign supplies of fresh reactor fuel, having previously 
experienced the cancellation of supplier contracts due to pressure from the US.26 On the 
other hand, nuclear power is an expensive venture, even more so when all the 
components of the fuel cycle are added. Russia, which has supplied nuclear reactor 
                                                 
23
 See for example, "Statement by the Australian Representative", (presented at the Fifty-Second General 
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September-October 2008). 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/Statements/index.html . "Statement delivered by Mr. 
Dominique Ristori, Deputy Director General for the Coordination of Nuclear Activities, Directorate-
General for Energy and Transport, European Commission", (presented at the Fifty-Second Session of the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September-October 2008). 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/Statements/index.html  
24
 Lawrence Scheinman, "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Nonproliferation," Disarmament 
Diplomacy 76(March/April 2004), 2-4. 
25
 "Address by His Excellency Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the 61st Session of the General 
Assemby," (2006), http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/iran-e.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2008. 
26
 Jean du Preez and Maya Nakumara, "Iran and the  IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?" 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003). Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_35a.html. Accessed 12 
December 2008. 
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technology to Iran in the past, offered a fuel supply arrangement to Iran in an effort to 
stop the development of an uranium enrichment centre. Iran refused this offer of 
assistance, as well as others, and continued its activities despite repeated requests from 
the IAEA to provide answers to unresolved issues.27 The history of secrecy, the lack of 
cooperation with the IAEA once its activities were revealed, and the illogic of 
developing a full nuclear energy programme while other less expensive options are 
available have lead many to believe that Iran is trying to manufacture nuclear weapons. 
The IAEA has been unable to fully conclude that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are for 
peaceful purposes.28 Herein lies the crux of the issue: is Iran using the provisions of the 
Treaty to disguise its true intentions, or is it simply making the most of its “inalienable 
right” to nuclear technology to provide a secure electricity supply for its population, 
while maintaining the option for export revenue that could be generated by oil and gas?  
 
To address the weaknesses within the non-proliferation regime, ElBaradei proposed the 
idea of internationalised uranium enrichment and reprocessing centres to curb the 
potential for the diversion of weapons-grade material, and provide assurances of fuel 
supply.29 A guaranteed fuel source reduces the incentive for states to enrich uranium 
indigenously, as obtaining ready-made fuel elsewhere is significantly less expensive 
than indigenous production. There is some evidence that states have already begun to 
accept this idea. Several working papers at the Preparatory Committees for the 2010 
                                                 
27
 Karl Vick, "Iran Rejects Russia's Proposal on Uranium: With Security Council Action Looming, 
Tehran Takes Stance of 'Wait and See'," Washington Post, 13 March 2006. Mohamed ElBaradei, 
"GOV/2010/10 - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security 
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran," (Vienna 2010). 
28
 ElBaradei, "GOV/2010/10 - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran," 9, Para. 47. 
29
 Mohamed ElBaradei, "Towards a Safer World," The Economist 369, no. 8346 (16 October 2003). 
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Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (Prep-Com) since 2003 propose 
initiatives and show support for multilateral arrangements. To date there have been 12 
official proposals, all of which are slightly different but carry the common multilateral 
theme (these will be outlined in more detail in Chapter Three). Put simply, the idea is 
for states to collectively engage in the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that pose the 
greatest risk for proliferation. Additional benefits that come from this approach include 
increased levels of safety and security for fuel cycle facilities, and preventing states 
from developing latent nuclear capacities. This may involve, for example, the creation 
of multilateral enrichment and reprocessing centres, or a fuel bank under the control of 
the IAEA. 
 
A growing number of states and individuals support the move toward multilateral 
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, but it is by no means a foregone conclusion that 
these approaches will replace indigenous nuclear development as the dominant 
international norm. Some states argue that because the “grand bargain” that the NNWS 
signed up to in the 1970s has not been reciprocated by the NWS in terms of nuclear 
disarmament, proposals that restrict their Article IV rights are unjust. Potential 
problems with the multinational approaches include a further widening of the gap 
between the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’; and unfair control and commercial 
benefits left to a few select states. Differing levels of technology, economic 
development and resources, as well as competing political considerations, mean states 
may reach differing conclusions as to how beneficial a multilateral fuel cycle will be.  
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This thesis explores both the fuel cycle proposals and state responses to them in an 
attempt to assess whether a new norm is emerging. It adopts a case study approach in 
order to achieve this, gauging responses to the fuel cycle proposals of four key states: – 
Australia, Indonesia, Norway and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The support of 
these states is critical for the norm to gain wider support, for the reasons explained in 
the methodology section in Chapter Two. Chapter Two provides the theoretical 
framework for this analysis: it explains how global norms develop in the international 
system, by drawing together realist explanations of state action and constructivist 
understandings of the role of ideological motivations that frame the collective 
behavioural changes of states. Chapter Three outlines the historical international efforts 
to control the spread of nuclear energy and its associated materials and technologies, 
then summarises recent proposals for multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives. Chapter 
Four presents the responses of the four cases to the multilateral concept using 
qualitative analysis (rather than quantitative which is better suited to larger case-study 
groups). Chapter Five discusses these responses further by considering them within the 
context of a ‘norm life cycle’: to what extent do the reactions of these states support or 
subvert the hypothesis that the multilateral approach is an emerging international norm? 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter Six, establishing the significance of this research 
within a broader context, and providing recommendations for policy and for further 
research.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
In the absence of an overarching authority in the international system, norms construct 
the rules of behaviour for the international community by defining the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour. Behavioural norms create and support a relatively stable 
international system, and prevent states from acting in whatever way they wish.30 In 
their article “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, Finnemore and 
Sikkink present a three-stage “norm life-cycle” that has become a key component of 
norm analysis. This framework identifies “norm emergence”, “norm cascade” and 
“internalisation” as three distinct stages of norm development, bridged by the “tipping 
point” between the first and second stages, where critical states embrace and support 
the norm, prompting others to do the same. Chapter Two of this thesis will expand on 
the way in which global norms develop in the international system, by drawing together 
realist explanations of state action and constructivist understandings of the role of 
ideological motivations in framing the collective behavioural changes of states. 
 
The constructivist approach to the study of international relations is reflective of its 
sociological origins, emphasizing the role of principles and ideas in shaping the 
behaviour of states within the international community, and recognizing the unique 
historical contexts that influence the way that states perceive themselves and others.31 
As such, the way in which states understand the actions and proposals for action made 
by others differs, depending on the level of priority given to any particular issue. The 
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constructivist perspective gives weight to the concept of international norms: ideas and 
rules give behavioural parameters to states, ideologically limiting their behavioural 
options on a number of global issues. Within this context, it could be argued that 
multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle are an emerging international norm, 
competing with the existing norm that permits the indigenous development of fuel 
cycle facilities, including those that pose the most proliferation risk.  
Three theoretical paradigms 
Realism 
Historically, international relations debates divided scholars into two main theoretical 
standpoints – realism and liberalism. Realist perspectives are embodied by Cold War 
logic and strategy. In the anarchical international system, conflict between states is a 
constant threat; therefore, acting in one’s own self-interest by maximising security and 
power are the primary concerns. The balance of power in the international system is 
vital to maintaining stability.32 However, in the post-Cold War world, realist logic looks 
increasingly out-of-date. States are no longer isolated entities, but are instead connected 
to each other in a myriad of ways. Further, the majority of states are no longer primarily 
faced with the threat of inter-state conflict; increasingly, threats are faced by multiple 
states or are even global in their nature – environmental degradation, the depletion of 
the earth’s ozone layer, financial crises, poverty, the uncontrolled spread of 
conventional arms, and terrorism.  
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Liberalism 
Classic liberalist perspectives identified domestic actors, organisations and structures as 
an influence on the interests and identities of states on the international stage. From the 
1980s, the focus shifted slightly, emphasising the interconnected nature of the 
international system and the role that international institutions and norms play in 
contemporary international relations.33 Neoliberal theorists, such as Robert Keohane, 
argue that while international organisations have played a progressively pervasive role 
in the international system, this is primarily driven by the desire for states to reduce 
costs and increase transparency, rather than power maximisation or moral concerns.34  
Constructivism 
During the latter part of the 20th century, a “third way” began to emerge. 
Constructivism can be seen as a path between the two traditional paradigms, drawing 
on a little from each and in doing so, addressing some of the perceived weaknesses in 
both schools of thought. The constructivist school views the international system with a 
sociological slant. For example, not only are states influenced by international norms, 
but they also play a role in creating them.35 While liberalist interpretations focus on the 
effect of norms and institutions on the behaviour of states, constructivists assert that 
during the process of successful norm creation, a negotiation occurs between states and 
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the norm, and between norms themselves.36 Constructivism differs most significantly 
from realism by acknowledging that states have unique historical and cultural contexts, 
from which they view the international system. These contexts give states different 
national values, which in turn affects their domestic priorities, foreign policies and 
behaviour in the international system.37 Thus, states do not always act in a manner that 
maximises their national security and power within the international system, although 
naturally, they do not act in a manner that decreases these either. This thesis assumes 
that international norms constrain state behaviour once they become internalised, but 
that during the process of emergence states have varying motivations for accepting and 
supporting the norm, both self-interested and ideological.  
Norms theory 
Norms theory is underpinned by the assumption that ideas and ideologies guide 
behaviour, in contrast with the realist approaches that have traditionally been dominant 
in international relations literature, and the liberalist approaches that have tried to 
account for realism’s shortcomings. Traditionally, norms theory was used as an 
anthropological tool, where it was applied to explain the behaviour of individuals in a 
social group. However, it is increasingly used to examine the emergence and operation 
of epistemic communities, international organisations, and regimes, despite the long-
standing preference for realist strategic logic and utility maximisation models.38  
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In the international system, states were once relatively free to behave as they pleased. 
However, since the turn of the 19th century, states have been subject to increasing 
behavioural restrictions, as the international community as a whole has redefined its 
boundaries. Norms guide state behaviour by providing expectations of behavioural 
standards, and are sometimes codified and implemented into rules or conventions, 
which actors then choose to “obey, break, or redefine”.39 Normative parameters help to 
facilitate social order, guiding actors toward pro-social behaviour by limiting 
behavioural options from what is physically possible to what is conceivably possible 
within the community.40 As they compete with each other for dominance within the 
international community, norms shift the boundaries of acceptable behaviour as new 
norms prevail over old ideas, providing a basis for explaining change in the 
international system. Research on international norms has traced now-globally 
recognised principles and behavioural standards from their emergence as ideas in the 
international arena. Norms have played a vital role in restraining and altering the 
behaviour of states, particularly over the course of the 20th century. Behaviours that 
were once considered standard practice, such as the capture, enslavement and trade of 
free peoples, were challenged by new ideas about universal human rights, leading to the 
end of the slave trade, slavery, and apartheid.41 Women’s suffrage, environmental 
protection and free trade all began as ideas that grew to become widely accepted 
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principles. Ideas about conduct during war have developed into norms regarding the use 
of certain weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear non-proliferation and the 
non-use of nuclear weapons, and have led to global conventions banning certain 
conventional weapons, including land mines and cluster munitions.42 
 
The slave trade was once common practice and highly profitable, until abolitionist 
groups emerged in Britain in the mid 1700s, whose members believed that decreasing 
the availability of new slaves would force owners to treat slaves in a more humane 
manner.43 However, it was not until 1807 that the British government passed the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade Act, rendering participation in the African Slave Trade 
illegal, despite its profitability at the time. Following this, the Royal Navy devoted 
around 20 per cent of its warships to the task of intercepting slave ships, boarding those 
suspected of carrying slaves.44 After 1817, Britain developed a network of bilateral 
treaties, allowing it the right to search vessels flying the flags of other states. Some of 
these bilateral treaties were “obtained at the barrel of a gun”; other countries that 
refused to sign were nonetheless subjected to the further boarding of ships suspected by 
the Royal Navy of involvement in the slave trade.45  
 
Norms theory has also been used to explain state choices where the outcome does not 
appear to fit within a realist understanding. According to Maria Rost Rublee, the most 
plausible scenario that explains the lack of nuclear proliferation is that the norm of non-
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proliferation has created a situation where it would be undesirable for states to ‘go 
nuclear’.46 The normative parameters change the cost-benefit calculation of this 
decision, adding “breaking with international standards of behaviour” to the costs. 
Within the increasingly interconnected international system, the price is too high for all 
but a few to pay.  
Criticism of realist approaches 
Norms theory and constructivism differ greatly from realism, which has been the 
traditional theoretical perspective for analysis of international relations. Realist theory 
centres around the belief that states are rational actors who will always act with their 
own self-interest as their primary concern. In the realist paradigm, “rationality of 
behaviour is presupposed; idealistic or altruistic motivations are excluded; and the 
pursuit of material self-interest is treated as the driving force of human behaviour”.47 
This approach tends to emphasise the strategic aspect of state behaviour, and exclude 
the normative aspect, often reducing norms to basic arguments about material interests 
versus ethical ideals.48 Realists characteristically reject norms as rationalisations for 
self-interest and deny that they have explanatory power.49 Even when there is a lack of 
self-interested motivations, some realists argue that altruism can be regarded as a 
strategic move for gains that will be acquired later.50 For example, the act of giving a 
gift may appear to solely benefit the recipient, but is possibly intended to establish a 
“relationship of reciprocity”.51 Where realist arguments most often fall short is in their 
lack of ability to explain change in the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the 
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international system, and their failure to explain policy convergences among large 
numbers of states.52 Additionally, realist predictions of widespread nuclear proliferation 
have not eventuated, indicating that other factors, including strong norms against 
nuclear weapons acquisitions, have influenced state behaviour.  
 
Realist perspectives view the international system as one where each state primarily 
looks after its own interests, by maximizing its own power in relation to other states.53 
Given this assumption, state choices are based on a “rational calculation of national 
interest”,54 and thus international norms do not directly influence state behaviour.55 
This perspective may help to explain state behaviour in some contexts, but not all. 
Nadelmann asserts that while international regimes do tend to reflect the economic and 
political interests of the more powerful states, moral factors that are unrelated to these 
interests “play important roles in the creation and evolution of such regimes”.56 The 
support of global powers is crucial to the development of new norms, but without the 
support of smaller states, normative change will not occur. Thus, within the 
international system, there are examples of both morally motivated and economically 
convenient norms. The inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral measures to combat 
illegal transnational activities tends to induce multilateral cooperation in both instances; 
no government has adequate resources to be able to effectively monitor “all of the high 
seas or to investigate and punish the array of illicit activities that are committed abroad 
and harm its interests or citizens”.57 Piracy and the slave trade are both examples of 
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prohibited behaviour that emerged as ideas, and became salient norms despite their 
advantages at the time, now enforced by their institutionalisation in global prohibition 
regimes.58   
 
Realism’s inability to broadly explain change in the international system does not 
necessarily mean that state behaviour is not influenced by realist motivations, nor does 
it render realist perspectives incompatible with constructivist approaches. To the 
contrary, as the constructivist perspective sees the cultural and political histories of 
each state as influences on its actions in the present. Thus, while an individual state 
may indeed be driven by realist-type power and utility maximisation, not all states are 
primarily focused on this endeavour.   
The norm life cycle 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s “norm life cycle” has become a key feature in the norms 
literature. They assert that norms evolve in a three-stage process. The first stage is 
“norm emergence”, where “norm entrepreneurs” attempt to persuade states to embrace 
a new norm. Those states that accept the new norm then become norm leaders, and help 
to win the support of others. Bridging the first and second stages is the “tipping point” 
where a “critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm”, causing the second stage 
– a “norm cascade”. The increased number of states accepting the new norm then leads 
to the third and final stage of the life cycle – “internalisation”. At this point, the norm 
becomes prevalent in the community and acquires a “taken-for-granted” quality.59 
Hulme and Fukudu-Parr assert that in addition, there is a distinction, in the final stage 
between “institutionalisation” and “implementation”, where a norm may have achieved 
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widespread vocal support, but practical action has not yet been enacted.60 This gap can 
be seen in their analysis of the Millennium Development Goals, and parallels with the 
perceived lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, despite its widespread vocal 
support.  
 
It is important to note, as Finnemore and Sikkink point out, that the emergence of a new 
norm does not guarantee that norm will reach the second or third stages and become a 
pervasive or salient norm; many norms emerge “but fail to reach a tipping point and 
therefore do not become an internalised, widespread belief”.61 While there is no exact 
number that indicates a “tipping point”, Finnemore and Sikkink assert that it often 
occurs when roughly one-third of states have accepted the norm. However, which states 
are involved is also significant.62 On any given issue in international relations, there is 
often a single state, or a small handful of states, whose support is necessary for the 
issue to move forward – global powers, regional leaders, or (potential) long-term 
holdouts. For example, as of April 2010, a number of key states have signed but failed 
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and the US are the only 
NWS that have not yet ratified. Their status as global power and NWS makes them 
critical states for the norm against nuclear testing. Their refusal to ratify the CTBT has 
been subsequently followed by the refusal of Cuba, DPRK, India, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Syria to sign. 
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Once a norm is established and internalised, most states will adhere to that norm, most 
of the time, though not necessarily for the same reasons. Motivational factors for norm 
adherence will have some variance between states. Likewise, states have varying 
reasons for supporting a new norm during its emergence, both self-interested and 
ideological. As illustrated by Maria Rost Rublee, norms theory and realist approaches 
are not mutually exclusive. Rublee asserts that behavioural change can occur in two 
ways: “(I) a cost-benefit calculation leading to change in behaviour, with no change in 
underlying preferences”. This realist mechanism can be broken down further into two 
subcategories: “(I.A) material costs and benefits”, and “(I.B) Social costs and benefits”. 
The second means of behavioural change is “(II) a change in preferences that leads to 
change in behaviour”.63 Although much of the constructivist studies on international 
norms have focussed on ideological preferences change (II), this thesis takes the view 
that a state’s cost-benefit calculation, including potential self-interest factors, is relevant 
for assessing norm development.64 This is because a state may choose to comply with 
an existing norm, or support an emerging one, for many reasons including that of self-
interest. Therefore, acknowledging the potential costs and benefits, both social and 
material, should be part of the equation. Cost-benefit calculations include a wide 
spectrum of factors, including economic stability, regional stability, human rights, 
environmental concerns and international awareness of state actions. For some, power 
maximisation is still a big factor; however, ‘power’ does not necessarily translate into 
the same traditional material terms for each state.  
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Looking at nuclear proliferation provides an example of this. Assuming that state 
security comes from military advantage, acquiring a nuclear weapon is a rational state 
response if its aim is to have more military power than its potential adversaries do.65 
However, only four states outside of the original NPT NWS have developed a nuclear 
weapon.66 The way in which a state perceives the international environment, and its 
own place within that system, affects its course of action by altering its “preferences”.67 
Small and middle power states may view the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a course 
of action that would diminish its legitimacy and make it a social outcast, instead of 
increasing its power within international society.68 The social cost of breaking the norm 
of non-proliferation is higher than the security gains the state would acquire, 
particularly when there are other means of increasing security. 
Identifying normative change 
Normative change becomes more apparent when an emerging norm or idea evolves 
through the ‘life cycle’ and reaches a ‘tipping point’. The majority of research 
evaluating normative change has been retrospective, examining successful 
transformation of behaviour in the international arena.69 Naturally, it is much easier to 
trace backwards than to predict into the future, or isolate important factors as they 
occur. However, Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle provides a useful tool for 
identifying potentially significant states, “norm leaders”, and other key states whose 
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support will be required for the emerging norm to become a successfully internalised 
one. 
 
What does an emerging norm require in order to become successful? The first factors 
are norm entrepreneurs, who work from an organisational platform, bring attention to 
the issue, and offer a new idea as a resolution to an issue. The entrepreneur plays a vital 
role in framing the situation in such a way that the new norm makes sense to others. 
Rublee suggests that one of the ways this process occurs is when the new norm is 
“linked” to conventional values.70 The second factors are norm leaders, states that 
embrace the norm early in its life cycle, and help convince others to support the idea. 
These states help to highlight the norm and the issue, “activating” the norm and 
emphasizing its importance. Activation does not always cause the successful cascade of 
acceptance, as emerging ideas constantly compete with one another for dominance71; 
not all of these can succeed. Rublee presents three conditions that affect the outcome of 
norm transmission – uncertainty, similarity and conflict. Uncertainty, particularly 
where the costs and/or benefits are in flux, creates a situation where group influence 
becomes more acceptable to individual actors. Individuals are more likely to internalise 
the influence of the group rather than simply conform. When environmental conditions 
are unstable or uncertain, similarity between a norm entrepreneur or norm leader and 
actors means the actors will accept their influence more readily. When an actor feels 
valued by, or values a group, conformity is more likely. Conflict negatively affects the 
influence of norm entrepreneurs and leaders; divisions within a group reduce their 
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ability to cooperate and dilute the effect of group influence. When conflict arises, actors 
within the group take sides, which can prevent others from effective persuasion.72  
 
On the other hand, “crisis triggers” can create a situation that is more conducive to the 
acceptance of new ideas, particularly among resistant states. The nuclear meltdown at 
Chernobyl provided a demonstrable example of the consequences of lax nuclear safety, 
and was followed by a dramatic decrease in the construction of new nuclear power 
plants as well as safety upgrades on a number of existing nuclear power plants.73 When 
India conducted its “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974, members of the international 
community responded through the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 
After the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme during the 1990 
Gulf War, further controls on the export of nuclear technology were agreed upon 
through the Wassenaar Arrangement. By bringing imagined worst-case scenarios into 
reality, crisis triggers can inspire cooperative action.  
A new norm of nuclear energy? 
The Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues and renewed interest in nuclear power can 
be viewed as crisis triggers for the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. It 
appears as though existing nuclear norms are being challenged by these environmental 
factors, and new ideas are emerging in order to thwart clandestine nuclear weapons 
development and proliferation from arising in the future. In an attempt to adapt the 
norm of non-proliferation to reflect current and potential future proliferation challenges, 
IAEA Director General ElBaradei began to promote multilateral nuclear approaches in 
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an op-ed published in The Economist in 2003.74 Since then a number of states have 
supported this idea and put forward proposals outlining how such a scheme might 
work.75 While only two of those specific proposals have managed to move forward 
concretely, there has been a significant amount of interest in the concept more 
broadly.76   
 
Despite the level of interest, there is concern about the wider implications of the 
introduction of a multilateral approach to the field of nuclear energy. In effect, a 
multilateral fuel cycle may mean further restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear 
technology for a number of states. Some developing states have expressed interest in 
utilising nuclear energy to supply electricity to their growing populations.77 As NPT 
member states, they have the right to access “equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” under Article IV of 
the Treaty. However, under a multilateral fuel cycle regime, that access may be limited 
to a few select states, as discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
Within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, two ideas are currently competing against 
each other for supremacy. One idea posits that a multilateral approach to nuclear energy 
will increase international scrutiny and make it virtually impossible for a state to 
embark on a path to nuclear weapons through a civilian nuclear energy programme. 
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The other suggests that restricting access to peaceful nuclear energy technologies goes 
against the spirit and text of the NPT, and impinges on the rights of NNWS. From the 
perspective of many NNWS, it is a concern that while most have held up their end of 
the NPT “grand bargain”, progress on nuclear disarmament by NWS has not been as 
far-reaching as they would have hoped. 
 
This thesis considers the concept of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as 
a potential or emerging international norm, through an examination of the responses of 
four case study states to the recent fuel cycle proposals. While process tracing is more 
typical for examining the development of international norms from their origins, this 
method is somewhat unsuitable for norms that have not yet become salient.78 Yet, we 
can still look for evidence of a norm’s progression through the life cycle as it arises. 
Other case-study methods include “controlled comparison”, where the investigator 
analyses a number of individual cases, then compares their observations to deduce 
theories; and “congruence procedures” which, like process tracing, infers “theories 
from observations within cases”.79 
 
The case study method has been criticised for its inability to be generalised to other 
cases.80 Although a single-case study provides a weak basis for applying results to 
others cases, the use of multiple cases can allow for the inference of broader 
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conclusions. Multiple-case studies with reasonably consistent background conditions 
provides a “semi-controlled environment” that allows results to give wider implications 
beyond the immediate cases presented.81  
 
The responses of these states, which are explored in Chapter Four, have the potential to 
be crucial to the success or failure of the norm, broadly due to their nuclear histories, 
position within the international system, and potential role to play within a multilateral 
fuel cycle. As one of the world’s few uranium exporters, Australia has a major role to 
play in this process. Embracing the multilateral approach could significantly affect the 
potential future economic benefits of the domestic uranium industry by limiting the 
available opportunities for expanded fuel cycle activities. Australian support for an 
internationalised fuel cycle would provide assurances to smaller, non-western states 
that may be wary of bigger global powers interfering in their sovereign territory. 
Indonesia has stated its intentions to move toward nuclear energy, and as a non-western 
NNWS and founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), its reaction to 
the multilateral approach will likely reflect that of other states in a similar position. 
Norway has taken a leadership role in the effort to minimize the use of HEU in civilian 
reactors, and is one of only a handful of states to have pledged a donation toward the 
initiative to create a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel reserve. At the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference, South Korea made comments supporting multinational approaches 
to the fuel cycle. If it chooses to forgo potential or latent nuclear capabilities in light of 
the tense security environment on the Korean Peninsula, this would add significant 
weight to the argument that the multilateral approach is an emerging international 
norm. 
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Chapter Three: The Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
This chapter provides a historical background to the efforts to control nuclear 
technology, the previous failed attempts to introduce multilateral nuclear approaches to 
the international community, and the current proposals for multilateral initiatives that 
came in response to ElBaradei’s revival of the idea. Controlling the spread of nuclear 
technology has been a primary concern since the dawn of the nuclear age. The nuclear 
weapons development by the US during WWII, the Manhattan Project, was conducted 
under an umbrella of secrecy in order to prevent its enemies from obtaining similar 
nuclear capabilities.82 After the former USSR conducted its first nuclear test in 1949, 
restrictions on technical cooperation for states developing nuclear power decreased.83 
Control increased during the 1970s following India’s nuclear weapons development, in 
the realisation that states could use peaceful nuclear activities to lead them to military 
weapons programmes. In the 1990s, control over nuclear technologies increased 
further, after the discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme, and North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT. While efforts to control the spread of nuclear technologies 
have been gradually increasing over the past six decades, the influence of states that 
engage in nuclear trade has limited the degree of global control. Previous efforts to 
promote multilateral approaches during the 1950s and 1970s were thwarted as well, due 
to the desire of states to retain national control over their nuclear activities.  
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A historical trend of control 
Post-WWII 
In the post-WWII environment, the UN Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was 
established by the first UN General Assembly Resolution in 1946, which aimed to 
bring nuclear energy and weapons technologies under international control to prevent 
their uncontrolled spread.84 That same year, the US proposed the Baruch Plan, based on 
a governmental report by Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Chairman of 
federally owned electric cooperation Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) David 
Lilienthal. The Acheson-Lilienthal report stated that inspection of nuclear facilities 
alone would provide insufficient protection against clandestine nuclear weapons 
development.85 The primary recommendation of the Report was the creation of “an 
international agency conducting all intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear 
field, with individual nations and their citizens free to conduct, under license and a 
minimum of inspection, all non-dangerous, or safe, operations”.86 The Baruch Plan, 
presented by the US at the UN AEC in 1946, proposed that an international atomic 
development agency should manage all aspects of atomic energy, controlling 
“dangerous” activities, and licensing and inspecting peaceful ones. The Plan also 
recommended that following the implementation of an adequate safeguards system and 
renunciation of nuclear weapons, states should cease weapons manufacture, destroy 
existing arsenals, and surrender nuclear secrets to the international atomic development 
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agency.87 The Plan was rejected by the former USSR, due to mistrust of the US.88 In 
that same year, the US congress mandated total secrecy on the atomic weapons 
programmes and banned all exports of nuclear technology and materials under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1 August 1946.89 Despite this, the USSR became the second 
nuclear-armed state three years later. In 1949, the US and its European allies 
established The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), 
to control dual-use exports to the Former USSR under an Industrial List.90  
 
In December 1953, President Eisenhower proposed the “Atoms for Peace” initiative at 
the UN General Assembly.91 This proposal called for cooperative efforts between the 
UK, the US, and the USSR to assist other states in developing peaceful nuclear energy, 
in exchange for a promise not to develop nuclear weapons. Atoms for Peace 
additionally advocated for the creation of an “international atomic energy agency to 
inspect and control all nuclear material”.92 Two years later, the US began to sign 
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of states, to supply nuclear 
reactors. Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Portugal and Turkey were among the first 
signatories, and were given declassified reactor information and up to six kilograms of 
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20% enriched uranium.93 By 1961, a total of 39 bilateral agreements had been signed.94 
Eisenhower’s vision of a uranium bank, created by a stockpile of fissile materials from 
US and USSR nuclear weapons, never eventuated. Instead, Atoms for Peace became 
nothing more than “a collection of agreements on bilateral technical cooperation and 
information exchange, backed up by a safeguards system that ultimately became the 
domain of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).”95  
 
The IAEA was established in 1957, amid much support from UN Member States. 
However, disagreement on the whether IAEA safeguards should apply to natural 
uranium, and if the IAEA should set levels for plutonium stockpiles, led to a diluted 
version of the safeguards system – one with the qualities that the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report had argued would fail to prevent nuclear proliferation.96 Indeed, the sharing of 
nuclear information and knowledge during this period marks the beginning of a number 
of nuclear weapons development cases. Indian scientists participated in US nuclear 
energy projects between 1955-1974. India purchased heavy water from the US in the 
1960s, which was used in an unsafeguarded Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) 
reactor that produced the plutonium used in the first Indian peaceful nuclear 
explosion.97 In 1959, the former USSR signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
North Korea, resulting in 30 years of training and technology exchange, including the 
construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.98 The know-how and 
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technology gained through cooperation with not only the USSR, but Canada, the former 
East Germany and Japan, ultimately gave North Korea the ability to develop its nuclear 
weapons programme.99  
Post-NPT 
Between 1965 and 1968, the NPT was negotiated, in recognition of the need to address 
the potential for peaceful nuclear energy programmes to lead to nuclear weapons 
development, and to ensure that proliferation of nuclear weapons was contained.100 
Shortly thereafter in 1971, the Zangger Committee collated a trigger-list of sensitive 
technologies; in order to import items on the list, states were required to accept IAEA 
safeguards and inspections.101 However, as the list only contained “especially designed 
or prepared” items rather than dual-use technologies, its effectiveness was limited.102 
Concern at India’s peaceful nuclear explosion was the catalyst that led to the creation of 
the NSG in 1975. The group developed a set of export standards for suppliers 
transferring nuclear technology and materials to NNWS, including “restraint” in the 
export of uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants.103 NSG’s guidelines were 
similar to those of the Zangger Committee, but went further in restraining uranium 
enrichment and plutonium extraction technology.104 Initially, the US advocated for the 
most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle to be prohibited from export, and 
reprocessing to take place in multilateral facilities.105 France and West Germany 
objected, the former having already agreed to sell reprocessing plants to Pakistan and 
                                                 
99
 Ibid., 27, 32. 
100
 Bertrand Goldschmidt, "The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," IAEA Bulletin 22, 
no. 3/4. 
101
 Yim, "Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power," 510. 
102
 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 415. 
103
 Yim, "Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power," 510. 
104
 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 413. 
105
 Ibid., 416. 
 36 
South Korea, and the latter, to provide full fuel cycle facilities to Brazil. These two 
states additionally objected to a requirement on full-scope safeguards as a condition of 
all sales. Although the US proposal did not go ahead, NSG did develop a trigger list of 
exports that would only be permitted if the items were covered by IAEA safeguards.106 
At the time, NSG had only seven members; as of April 2010, membership has 
expanded to 46 members and one observer (the European Commission).107  
 
Also in 1975, the IAEA began an international dialogue on the technical aspects of 
nuclear proliferation, the “Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres Study Project”.108 
Prompted by concern over the nuclear waste and reprocessing at back-end of the fuel 
cycle and an anticipated expansion of nuclear power, the study examined “the 
economic, safety, safeguards and security aspects of a multinational as opposed to a 
wholly national nuclear fuel cycle approach”.109 The 1977 report of the project 
highlighted non-proliferation and safeguards, radioactive waste management, and 
economic considerations of the centres, focussing on back-end multilateral 
arrangements. Economically, the benefits of economies of scale significantly reduce the 
costs of constructing and operating. Multiple states pooling their resources would be 
able to deal with waste more cost-effectively with larger facilities, and the national 
investment (capital plus operating costs) could be reduced by an estimated 40-60% for 
larger states, and at least 30% for smaller countries.110 From a non-proliferation 
standpoint, RFCC arrangements would improve export controls on sensitive 
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technologies and allow better physical protection of sensitive facilities.111 Economic 
advantages would flow on from having a wider pool of potential location sites for 
facilities, which additionally would have operational advantages if co-location were 
possible.112  
 
The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study of 1977-1980 was a 
technical and analytical study, as and such, the 25000 pages of reports from its working 
groups did not contain policy recommendations.113 Rather, the study addressed the 
technical possibilities of regional fuel cycle facilities and multilateral approaches to the 
back-end of the fuel cycle, such as the storage of plutonium. Neither the RFCC nor 
INFCE studies developed into multilateral action, as concerns regarding the “plutonium 
economy” decreased, and a lack of willingness to forgo national reprocessing control 
prevented progress in this area.114 
 
The IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) and the IAEA 
Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) followed the two previous studies in the 
1980s. Once again, the enthusiasm of the IAEA and a small number of states was not 
matched by the wider international community, with the majority of states unwilling to 
relinquish sovereign control over their nuclear activities.115 
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Post-Cold War 
The 1990 Gulf War revealed Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, a 
exposure that demonstrated NPT membership was not a foolproof barrier preventing 
proliferation. In response, the NSG developed further restrictions on the export of dual-
use nuclear technology and materials in 1992.116 In July 1996, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies was established as a non-binding multilateral export control regime, “to 
contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies”.117 There are currently 40 participating states, which “seek, 
through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute 
to the development or enhancement of military capabilities.”118 The Arrangement 
entails a set of guidelines on conventional arms and another on dual-use items and 
technologies, based on an agreed list of controlled goods. States have the discretion to 
accept or deny requests for export of dual-use items; members exchange information on 
all export license denials for items on the Sensitive List, a subset of the dual-use list, 
and license approvals by the state that were denied by others in the preceding 12 
months.119  
 
Efforts to control the spread of nuclear technology, particularly dual-use and sensitive 
items and materials, have been made by a majority of states since the 1940s. The 
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dangers of nuclear know-how and technology being obtained by states under the 
pretence of peaceful nuclear applications has always been a concern, dealt with through 
controlling access to technology by multilateral coordination of export controls and 
information sharing. When the NPT was negotiated in the latter half of the 1960s, the 
problematic nature of dual-use nuclear technology was not forgotten; however, the need 
for NNWS to secure access to peaceful applications was also paramount for them. 
More than four decades later, this issue remains unresolved and problematic, as 
exemplified by the ongoing Iranian nuclear situation.   
Post-Iran - new multilateral proposals 
The 2003 revelations of the twenty years of clandestine nuclear activities in Iran 
shocked the international community, and triggered a revival of the multilateral nuclear 
fuel cycle concept. In his 2003 article in The Economist, ElBaradei described the need 
for collective non-nuclear security in response to the battered state of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Limitations on the processing of weapons-usable material, 
proliferation-resistant nuclear power systems, and multilateral nuclear approaches, he 
argued, should be regarded as a “peremptory norm” in the international system, binding 
on all states with no exceptions.120 To further explore this idea, ElBaradei appointed an 
international group of experts in 2004 to consider possible multilateral approaches to 
the nuclear fuel cycle.121 The Group released its report in February 2005, outlining five 
suggested multi-national approaches: 
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• Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms through long term 
commercial contracts and government-backed suppliers’ arrangements, 
including fuel leasing, take-back, storage and fuel banks;122  
• Developing international supply guarantees involving the IAEA. The IAEA 
may act as a guarantor of service supplies, for example by administrating a fuel 
bank;123 
• Promoting voluntary conversion of existing national facilities to multinational 
ones, with the participation of NPT NNWS and NWS, and non-NPT States;124  
• Creating multinational arrangements for new facilities, utilising joint-
ownership or co-management for front and back end nuclear facilities;125 
• The development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral 
arrangements and broader cooperation involving international organisations 
such as the IAEA.126  
 
The Expert Group intended for these recommendations to be introduced gradually, 
moving from fuel assurances with IAEA involvement, to the conversion of existing 
facilities to multilateral control, and eventually new multilateral facilities. Multilateral 
arrangements have been shown to be successful with the Anglo-Dutch-German 
uranium enrichment company URENCO, which conducts enrichment in one country 
only but supplies fuel to its co-financing partners.127 After this report was released, 
other states began to put forward more refined proposals drawing on the five 
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suggestions from the Expert Group. There are a number of additional proposals 
currently on the table that have followed the Report’s release, outlined in the following 
section. These can be broadly categorised into three groups: global visions, shared 
facilities, and assurance of supply. 
Global visions 
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is an initiative lead by the US, 
proposed in early 2006.128 GNEP aims to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation by 
developing proliferation-resistant nuclear power technologies and providing 
multilateral nuclear fuel cycle services, including the provision of reliable fuel sources 
and spent fuel take-back. Through GNEP, the US wanted to cooperate with countries 
with “secure and advanced nuclear capabilities”, to provide fresh fuel to, and recover 
used fuel from, States who agree to use nuclear energy solely for power generation.129  
 
According to the US Department of Energy (DOE), this initiative will reduce carbon 
emissions (by increasing the number of states using nuclear energy for generating 
electricity); reduce the capability of “rogue states or terrorists” to use plutonium 
separated from spent fuel for nuclear weapons (through the development of more 
advanced reprocessing facilities); make nuclear energy available to a wider number of 
states (by creating a reliable fuel source that does not require states to develop their 
own nuclear fuel cycle facilities indigenously); and enhance the global non-
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proliferation regime by reducing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies (by limiting them to advanced nuclear states). 130 Today there are three 
permanent international nongovernment observers and 25 participating observer 
countries.131  
 
The GNEP framework was widely criticised. Commentators have described GNEP as a 
“premature”, “goofy idea” that is “expensive, misdirected and out of sync with the 
needs of the industry and the nation”.132 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 
published a scathing article highlighting many weaknesses and illogical arguments put 
forward by the scheme’s proponents, including the DOE’s focus on selling GNEP 
through public relations rather than on technical grounds.133 A recently re-released 
“Strategic Plan” that used the word “recycling” 37 times in 10 pages exemplifies this. 
In the new version of the Plan, terms such as “Advanced Burner Reactor” were altered, 
becoming “Advanced Recycling Reactor”. The “Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center”, 
a reprocessing plant for spent fuel, became the “Nuclear Fuel Recycling Center”. 
Rebranding nuclear facilities with ‘green’ terminology would presumably alleviate 
public concerns regarding the proximity of nuclear facilities to local communities, 
making the idea more publicly acceptable.  
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One of the most concerning elements of GNEP was the speed at which it was pushed 
through the system under the Bush Administration. In August 2006, DOE announced 
they were going to skip the demonstration process and go directly to commercial scale 
plants and a commercial sized fast neutron reactor, while continuing research on 
advanced reprocessing technologies and reactors.134 In 2007, the US Congress 
Committee on Appropriations voiced its concerns over the President’s rush to get 
GNEP up and running, stating in the Energy and Water budget for 2008 that it is 
“unnecessary to rush into a plan that continues to raise concerns among scientists and 
has only weak support from industry given that there are reasonable options available 
for short term storage of nuclear waste and that this project will cost tens of billions of 
dollars and last for decades”.135 One year later, the Committee cut all GNEP funding in 
the 2009 budget, stating that the initiative undermines US non-proliferation policy.136 
 
Other criticisms highlighted the lack of research on the technologies upon which GNEP 
proposed to expand. The framework is reliant on unproven, under-developed 
technologies for the reprocessing of spent fuel. Additionally, states who “sign up” are 
not required to make a legally binding commitment or to commit any funding to the 
scheme; they merely agree to support the expansion of nuclear power and the closure of 
the nuclear fuel cycle.137  
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Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure 
In January 2006, the Russian government began to promote the “Global Nuclear Power 
Infrastructure” (GNPI), a global network of enrichment centres that would deal with the 
enrichment stage of the fuel cycle, operating under IAEA safeguards.138 The “Statement 
on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” emphasized the need to create a global 
infrastructure allowing equal access to nuclear energy, and suggested international fuel 
cycle service centres under IAEA auspices as one potential element.139 Under GNPI, 
those states that wish to participate in the scheme would enjoy equal access to enriched 
uranium. 
 
International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk 
While there has been little discussion about the back-end of the fuel cycle, Russia has 
moved forward with great momentum since the initial enrichment proposal in 2006. 
The Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine (AECC), an existing Russian nuclear fuel 
cycle facility that has provided enrichment services since the 1980s, was chosen to 
house the pilot GNPI international uranium enrichment centre (IUEC).140 The first 
IUEC agreement was concluded between Russia and Kazakhstan on 10 May 2007.141 
The IUEC will be operated on Russian soil and under Russian law as a “commercial 
company co-owned and co-managed by the shareholders”, who are commercial 
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companies authorized by their own governments.142 Technology within the AECC-
IUEC will be “black boxed”; Russia will maintain exclusive control and shareholders 
will not have access to the sensitive technology or nuclear materials. This provides the 
assurance that Russia is meeting its non-proliferation obligations.143 Kazakh state-
owned nuclear company Kazatomprom (KAP) holds 10% share of the IUEC, as does 
Armenia’s NPP - Medzamor, which officially joined in February 2008.144 Armenia’s 
uranium deposits will be enriched at Angarsk, and Russia will assist in the construction 
of a new nuclear power reactor in Armenia.145 Ukraine seems set to join in 2010, and 
Russia recently agreed to build two reactors there.146 Russia has reportedly had interest 
in IUEC partnerships with Mongolia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan. In May 2008, a 
Japanese delegation visited Angarsk with a view to develop Japanese-Russian 
cooperation and obtain first-hand knowledge about the IUEC. Belgium, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Finland, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia, and South Korea have been invited to 
participate in the IUEC.147  In 2010, the chair of India’s Atomic Energy Commission 
announced India’s interest in participating.148 In addition to the uranium enrichment 
initiative, the IAEA and ROSATOM signed an agreement on 29 March 2010 to create a 
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reserve of LEU stored at the IUEC as UF6 under IAEA safeguards.149 The agreement 
marks a significant step forward for the IAEA Fuel Bank proposal, which will be 
detailed later in this chapter. 
Shared facilities 
Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project 
The German Government circulated its Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project 
(MESP) proposal on 7 May 2007.150 MESP aims to reduce incentives for states to 
develop indigenous uranium enrichment centres, by guaranteeing access to nuclear fuel, 
regardless of political considerations.151 An International Enrichment Centre (IEC), 
operating under the control of the IAEA, would provide the supply of fresh fuel.152 
Much like the Russian proposal, the IEC would be commercially operated, but on 
“international property”.153 A Host Country would allow the IAEA to have control and 
some sovereign rights over a portion of their territory.154 The enrichment plant would 
be owned, managed, and governed by an international commercial company set up by a 
Group of Interested States (GIS), and operate under normal market conditions.155 By 
allowing participating states to share in the commercial operation of the plant, as well 
as access to a fresh fuel supply, MESP aims to prevent further development of national 
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enrichment plants and provide a cost-effective way of expanding global enrichment 
capabilities. 
 
Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
In 2007, the Austrian government put forward a proposal that suggested the creation of 
an International Nuclear Fuel Bank to increase the international transparency.156 In 
subsequent statements, Austria has suggested that the IAEA act as an intermediary for 
all civilian nuclear transactions.157 IAEA involvement could gradually be increased to 
include control over enrichment and reprocessing facilities.158 Eventually, all national 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities would be under IAEA auspices.159 
Assurance of supply  
Nuclear Threat Initiative – IAEA Fuel Bank 
In 2006, non-profit organisation the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) announced its 
intention to donate $50 million towards the creation of an IAEA LEU stockpile.160 The 
fuel bank will act as a guaranteed supply of nuclear reactor fuel for states that have 
chosen not to build indigenous fuel cycle facilities and have had their ordinary supply 
interrupted. The NTI donation was conditionally on IAEA Member States committing 
an additional $100 million in funding for the fuel reserve. In December 2008, the 
European Union pledged Euro 25 million (approximately US$32 million). In March 
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2009, Kuwait announced a pledge of US$10 million. The pledge joins those of Norway 
($5 million), The United Arab Emirates ($10 million) and the United States ($50 
million), to total approximately US$107 million in contributions, and was able to be put 
into motion by the IAEA Board of Governors.161 This process had become stalled until 
Russia offered to house the Fuel Bank at its Angarsk facility. In 2010, the agreement 
between the IAEA and Russia was formalised.162 
 
Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 
The Six Nation Proposal, “Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to 
Nuclear Fuel” (RANF), aims to provide a solution to problems arising from enrichment 
contracts being disrupted for political reasons.163 Tabled in June 2006, RANF is an 
initiative from the six enrichment supplier states – France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Russia, the U.K. and the US – and offers a guarantee of fresh fuel supply from 
international markets to states that opt out of national enrichment activities. As a 
backup mechanism operated through the IAEA, RANF ensures that states adhering to 
their IAEA non-proliferation obligations would be able to arrange a new supply if their 
existing supply arrangements were interrupted for non-commercial or technical 
reasons.164 In the case that this mechanism is unsuccessful, a reserve of enriched 
uranium could be utilized, again via the IAEA. 
                                                 
161
 "Multinational Fuel Bank Proposal Reaches Key Milestone: Kuwait Pledge of US $10 Million 
Secures International Funding for Next Steps ", International Atomic Energy Agency, 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/fbankmilestone.html. Accessed March 9 2009. 
162
 Sasha Henriques, "Agreement Signed to Set Up a Low Enriched Uranium Reserve." 
163
 "GOV/INF/2006/10: Communication dated 31 May 2006 received from the Permanent Missions of 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America,"  (IAEA, 2006). "GOV/INF/2007/11: Possible New 
Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel," ed. 
IAEA Board of Governors (Vienna: IAEA, 2007), Annex 9: 4. 
164
 As outlined in the proposal, this includes: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional 
Protocols entered into force; adherence to nuclear safety standards and the CPPNM; and abstention from 
 49 
 
IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply 
The IAEA Standby Arrangements System proposal was put forward by Japan on 
September 1, 2006.165 The proposal aims to establish a “Standby Arrangements 
System” under IAEA auspices, which will help to prevent market failure through 
increased sharing of information, in addition to the assurance of a supply system in the 
six-nation proposal.166  
 
Enrichment Bonds 
In 2006, the UK proposed a virtual fuel reserve, as a logistical suggestion to follow up 
the RANF proposal.167 An Enrichment Bond would be realised through a three-way 
agreement between the IAEA, a supplier state and a recipient state. The supplier state 
would agree that its national enrichment providers would not be prohibited from 
supplying the recipient state with its enrichment services, should the guarantee in the 
agreement be invoked.168 Naturally, this would also be subject to compliance with 
IAEA non-proliferation commitments and international law.169 Using the IAEA as an 
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intermediary will create confidence in the scheme, particularly for smaller, non-
Western or developing states. 
 
Reserve of Nuclear Fuel 
At the forty-ninth session of the IAEA General Conference in September 2005, the US 
announced its intention to commit up to 17 metric tons of HEU to be blended down into 
LEU and placed in a fuel reserve. This would support other efforts to provide reliable 
access to fuel for states that choose to avoid the development of indigenous enrichment 
and reprocessing.170  
 
Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
The World Nuclear Association published a report in May 2006 outlining the position 
of the collective uranium industry on reinforcing existing assurances for the supply of 
enrichment and reprocessing services.171 The proposal envisages two levels of 
guarantees, in addition to the existing guarantee of supply provided by the strong 
performance record of the international market.172 A second level would come from 
agreements between states performing enrichment services and the IAEA, to be 
invoked when normal commercial supplies are interrupted due to political causes.173 
The third level of assurances comes from governmental reserves of enriched uranium, 
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which could be accessed in the event that enrichment service providers could not meet 
their level two commitments.174  
 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
A non-paper submitted to the IAEA for discussion by the European Union (EU) 
proposed that proliferation resistant technology, long-term supply arrangements, equal 
rights and obligations on suppliers and consumers, and market neutrality should all 
form part of multilateral approaches to nuclear energy. Subsequently, the EU argued 
that no singular approach should be taken; rather all options should be considered, in 
order to take into account the varying concerns of states.175 
 
The Expert Group envisioned that a global shift in nuclear fuel cycle practices might 
begin with supply guarantees. Interrupted supply of fuel is a primary concern for states 
considering nuclear energy, and one reason Iran put forward in defence of its 
construction of an enrichment facility.176 Sourcing fuel from a provider on the 
international market has two primary benefits for the recipient state. The first is 
economic; enrichment facilities are expensive, and an international guarantee that fuel 
will be provided negates the need to construct such a facility. Secondly, an international 
market that is commercially competitive and free of monopolies and political 
constraints is beneficial to both consumers and producers because it would be more 
stable. 
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Proposals that aim more directly to deal with non-proliferation will add to that sense of 
stability. The proliferation risks usually associated with facilities containing sensitive 
materials or technology can be offset by multilaterally-controlled facilities. Diversion 
and theft of materials or technology, diffusion of sensitive technology to unauthorised 
entities, clandestine or parallel military programmes are unlikely to occur while so 
many eyes from a number of states are watching. In addition, the chance that a state 
could obtain technology and knowledge and then “breakout” from the NPT regime is 
minimal if facilities are multi-national.
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Chapter Four: Case Studies 
The multilateral proposals outlined in Chapter Three are the first sign that the 
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has gained significant support from 
global powers, such as the US and Russia, and nuclear suppliers, such as France. While 
the support of these states is crucial for the development of the multilateral norm, 
developing states, potential nuclear customers, and non-nuclear developed states will 
also need to accept and support the initiatives in order for this potential norm to evolve 
through the norm life cycle.  
 
In order to assess whether the response to the multilateral fuel cycle proposals is 
indicative of an emerging international norm, Chapter Four will examine the responses 
of four states: Australia, Indonesia, Norway, and South Korea. All four states have 
historical experience with peaceful nuclear energy, giving them a degree of similarity 
that is useful for contrasting their responses. Indonesia and South Korea have clear 
intentions to expand their domestic nuclear industries; Australia has explored this 
option in recent years, although public support for this is limited. Norway has neither 
the need for nuclear power, nor the inclination, and in this research provides an 
example of a ‘positive test’ for support of the norm, a useful point of comparison for 
the other three cases.  
Case study one: Australia 
Australia’s history as a strong non-proliferation advocate, exporter of yellowcake, 
limited experience with peaceful nuclear energy and an apparent aversion to domestic 
nuclear power renders its response to the multilateral proposals worthy of 
consideration. Primarily, this premise rests on the assumption that Australia may be a 
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prime candidate to facilitate or host a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle venture, due to its 
position as a middle, rather than great, power within the international system, and 
geographic location near Asia, which is set for nuclear power expansion in the near 
future. While such an undertaking would have economic and social benefits for 
Australia, it also may be more palatable for prospective customer states to accept 
Australia as its supplier. As the holder of the world’s largest Reasonably Assured 
Resources (RAR) of uranium recoverable at low cost, Australia will remain a key 
player in international nuclear fuel cycle activities.  
Australia’s nuclear history 
Uranium was first discovered in Australia in 1894.177 During the 1930s, two sites in 
South Australia, Radium Hill and Mount Painter, were mined for radium for medical 
uses.178 After WWII, the Australian Government incentivised the discovery and mining 
of uranium in response to requests from the U.K. and the US for uranium sources, 
which would eventually fuel their nuclear weapons.179 Hundreds of deposits were 
discovered in Queensland and the Northern Territory, and mining soon began at Mary 
Kathleen, Rum Jungle, Radium Hill and other areas.180 Between 1944 and 1964, some 
7300 tonnes of uranium ore were exported.181 In 1984, the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP), in government at the time, introduced a “three mines” policy, restricting 
uranium mining to the Ranger and Nabarlek mines in the Northern Territory, and 
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Olympic Dam in South Australia. This policy was overturned in 2007 leading up to the 
general election; however, mining is currently still only permitted in New South Wales, 
Northern Territory and South Australia. Exploration is permitted in Queensland. 
Currently, the three operating mines are Ranger in the Northern Territory, and Beverley 
and Olympic Dam in South Australia. In addition, Honeymoon and Four Mile in South 
Australia are nearing production capability, and several other prospective sites are 
being investigated in Western Australia.182  
 
In 1956, construction began on the High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR), which 
reached criticality in January 1958 and routine full-strength in 1960.183 Originally built 
to test materials for future power reactors, HIFAR produced neutrons for nuclear 
medicine and scientific research for almost 50 years until it was shut down in 2007.184 
Its replacement, the Open Pool Australian Lightwater reactor (OPAL) reached 
criticality in 2006 and was opened in 2007, but has had significant water seepage 
problems requiring extended shutdown periods. OPAL returned to normal operation in 
2010. 
 
During the early 1970s, the Australia Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) conducted 
research into laser isotope separation and the feasibility of an enrichment plant in 
Australia, and continued secret centrifuge research that had been carried out at the 
Lucas Heights facility since the mid-1960s.185 AAEC Annual Reports during the 1970s 
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indicate an intention to develop a wider spectrum of fuel cycle facilities in Australia, 
including the conversion of yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride gas.186 Throughout the 
1970s, several studies were completed on potential nuclear fuel facilities, including a 
joint feasibility study with Japan on the construction of an enrichment plant for 
Australia;187 a study on conversion and enrichment plants in South Australia, which 
was conducted by URENCO, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., and the AAEC;188 and a 
government study on the feasibility of an Australian commercial uranium enrichment 
industry, with maximum processing of raw materials prior to export.189 
 
In 1983, the government terminated work on uranium enrichment and laser enrichment 
due to lack of funding and failure to keep up with competing overseas progress.190 In 
the mid-1980s, the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia (UEGA) abandoned its 
plans for a final-stage feasibility study on the establishment of a centrifuge enrichment 
facility.191 The AAEC was replaced by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation (ANSTO) in 1987, and although the new organisation still provides the 
government with advice, few experts remain in the specific area of uranium 
enrichment.192 
 
Australia’s experience in the field of peaceful nuclear energy has been gained through 
more than 50 years of operation of two research reactors, and its uranium mining 
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industry. Although there is interest in developing the nuclear industry, a lack of 
technical knowledge and expertise, legal barriers, widespread domestic anti-nuclear 
sentiment and concern regarding the effect on the indigenous Aborigine population 
present major obstacles to expansion of any sort.193  
Australia’s response to international fuel cycle proposals 
Australian support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been 
positive, although somewhat mild. Following ElBaradei’s 2003 article in The 
Economist, an Australian statement at the 2004 NPT PrepCom gave support to the 
“development of an international dialogue on limiting the spread of sensitive 
technologies”.194 The statement also suggested that “states may wish to consider a 
moratorium on any new enrichment or reprocessing plants”, until international dialogue 
on limiting the spread of such capabilities was established.195 At the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference, a joint working paper submitted by Australia emphasised the need for 
balance between non-proliferation efforts and access to peaceful nuclear energy, stating 
that multilateral approaches should complement existing non-proliferation mechanisms 
such as IAEA safeguards and export controls.196 In a statement to the Main Committee 
III, Australian representative Terry Bevan argued that rather than debate the legal 
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interpretation of Article IV, states should “consider the consequences of a world in 
which dozens of states possess the full nuclear fuel cycle and the capability to break out 
to nuclear weapons should they consider it in their immediate interests”. The statement 
argued further that indeed such a “spread of sensitive technology would be inconsistent 
with the non-proliferation goals of the treaty”.197 
 
In June 2006, the Australian Government began a major review of the country’s nuclear 
industry, the Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review (UMPNER).198 
The release of the UMPNER report followed the publication of two related government 
reports – “Australia’s Uranium – Greenhouse friendly fuel for an energy hungry 
world”199 and the September report by the Uranium Industry Framework (UIF) Steering 
Group.200 The UMPNER taskforce was appointed by the Prime Minister to review 
“uranium mining, value-added processing and the contribution of nuclear energy in 
Australia.”201 The report was released in 2007, and highlighted the opportunity for 
Australia to expand its nuclear industry in several areas, including: increasing 
production and export of uranium oxide to meet the expected increase in demand; 
adding value to such exports by including fuel fabrication, uranium conversion and 
enrichment; constructing a national repository of low-level waste, and investigating 
deep and underground repositories; investigating nuclear power as an option for 
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meeting expected increases in domestic power demand; removing legal and technical 
barriers to the implementation of an expansion of the nuclear industry in Australia; 
increasing the nuclear knowledge and skills base; and encouraging “informed 
discussion of the issues.”202 
 
The “Australia’s Uranium” report examined the strategic importance of the country’s 
uranium resources, its potential to be used to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, 
and the environmental impact of Australia’s uranium, including nuclear waste 
management.203 The report regarded Australia as being in a good position to expand its 
uranium industry, and suggested that the fact that Australia lags behind in production 
and export, despite having substantially larger uranium reserves than all other 
competitors, is “unsatisfactory for the nation.”204 Failure to allow industry development 
has significant costs, including “loss of the industry’s current and potential contribution 
to the national and state economies, regional development, services and employment in 
Aboriginal communities and further promotion of Australia’s role in the international 
nuclear community.”205 The Committee recommended that the Australian Government 
establish an uranium enrichment industry, develop a waste disposal industry and a 
geologic repository, develop the full fuel cycle, including the ‘leasing’ of fuel 
assemblies to customer countries, and the take-back of waste for final disposal.206 Such 
an expansion of nuclear activities, including development of fuel cycle services, would 
also require a parallel progression of Australia’s nuclear skills base.207 
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The “Uranium Industry Steering Group” was charged to identify “opportunities for, and 
impediments to, the sustainable development of the Australian uranium industry” in the 
short, medium and longer term. The recommended actions included in the report were 
aimed at increasing Australia’s international competitiveness, and “fostering broader 
community understanding and acceptance of the economic and social benefits derived 
from having a safe, secure, efficient and highly productive Australian uranium mining 
industry.”208 While the majority of its recommendations were largely regulatory and of 
little consequence to this research, such government-directed research of the nuclear 
industry is significant, as it demonstrates a desire to stimulate thinking on this issue.  
 
Following the release of these reports, and ahead of the 2007 NPT Prep-Com, then-
Prime Minister John Howard unveiled a new nuclear policy that would see further 
development of the uranium mining industry in Australia.209 The Government’s 
strategy involved removing existing legal restrictions on uranium mining, with a view 
to increasing exports and an expansion of the domestic nuclear industry, including the 
possibility of nuclear power.210 During the Prep-Com, an Australian Working Paper 
reiterated the dangers of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing as dual-use 
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Paper stated Australia’s openness to exploring the 
potential for fuel assurances to reduce the incentive to seek indigenous dual-use fuel 
cycle capabilities.211 During the general debate, Australia reflected on the way in which 
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the Iranian situation had put the enrichment and reprocessing aspects of the fuel cycle 
under scrutiny, and re-stated its support for international dialogue on multilateral 
approaches, which “have the potential to advance energy security and non-proliferation 
objectives”.212 
 
In September 2007, Australia joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. In a 
statement to the IAEA General Conference that same week, Australia announced that it 
had signed the Statement of Principles, becoming a partner in an initiative that 
“deserves broad support” in its goal to minimise the proliferation risks posed by an 
expansion of peaceful nuclear energy.213 The statement also referred to the commitment 
Australia had made to participate in the Generation IV International Forum, and the 
government’s decision to export uranium to India, subject to an exception to the 
guidelines of export by the NSG.214 
 
Leading up to the general election in December 2007, the subject of nuclear power and 
the role it may play in Australia’s future divided public opinion. Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd was elected, ending 17 years of Liberal Party leadership under Howard, and 
bringing in a new government with very different views on nuclear issues. Unlike 
Howard, who was increasingly in favour of nuclear power in Australia, Rudd and the 
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Australian Labor Party were vehemently opposed. However, this had little effect on 
Australia’s outward view on multilateral fuel cycle approaches.  
 
Many of the sentiments expressed at the 2007 Prep-Com were repeated in 2008 in the 
Vienna Group working paper, and Australian statements, once again indicated an 
interest in constructively exploring proposals which “support and strengthen the non-
proliferation objectives of the NPT.”215 The working paper stressed that multilateral 
approaches should complement existing non-proliferation instruments and, where 
appropriate, should be under the auspices of the IAEA while ensuring commercial 
competitiveness.216  
 
In 2008 Australia jointly established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament with Japan. With the aim of contributing to the nuclear 
debate, and building momentum and consensus in the lead up to the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference, the creation of the commission was reflective of the priority both Australia 
and Japan place on nuclear issues. 
 
Australia’s response to the multilateral proposals was initially very positive. Then-
Prime Minister Howard wanted to capitalise on this movement by value-adding 
uranium exports through enrichment and fuel production. In many ways, Australia’s 
strong non-proliferation history and position as a middle power within the international 
system makes it a prime candidate for such a venture; it carries favour among some 
developing nations that other more advanced nuclear states may not enjoy to the same 
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degree. Since the election of current Prime Minister Rudd in 2008, Australia has 
remained supportive of multilateral approaches as a non-proliferation measure, but the 
Government also seems wary about being perceived as “pro-nuclear” domestically. 
Within Australia, support for indigenous development of the nuclear industry is limited, 
and Rudd’s Labor Party has traditionally opposed such expansion. Prior to the 2007 
election, Rudd specifically addressed the nuclear issue on a number of occasions, 
stating that despite the Labor Party’s reversal on its opposition to uranium mine 
expansion, nuclear power was an unnecessary option for Australia.217 Submissions for 
the aforementioned reports suggest commercial interest in the growth of the nuclear 
industry, which is logical for a country with huge uranium resources. Furthermore, 
given the plans for nuclear power expansion in Southeast Asia, Australia may be a 
prime candidate to facilitate multilateral approaches in the region. 
Case study two: Indonesia 
Indonesia is the world’s largest Islamic state, with the fourth largest population 
globally. In addition, as a founding member of NAM, Indonesia’s response to this issue 
will be influential over smaller, developing states, as well as members of NAM. As one 
of the states that has shown serious interest in domestic nuclear power, Indonesia 
potentially has much to lost under a multilateral scheme. Indonesia has a strongest 
nuclear science experience of the ASEAN states. Its enthusiasm or apathy for the 
multilateral approach may influence a significant number of other states that are 
interested in adopting nuclear power. 
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Indonesia’s nuclear history 
Although Indonesia is not yet a nuclear-powered state, it has made a strong investment 
in developing its nuclear science and technology skills and knowledge base, as well as a 
number of research and development facilities. After joining the IAEA in 1957, the 
Institute of Atomic Energy (Lembaga Tenaga Atom, or LTA) was established in 1959, 
with the aim of conducting nuclear research and promoting nuclear energy. Nuclear 
cooperation agreements were signed with the US, the USSR and Yugoslavia under the 
Atoms for Peace between 1956 and 1960.218 In 1965, the Institute was renamed the 
National Atomic Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional, or BATAN). 
Indonesia’s first research reactor achieved criticality in 1964 at the Bandung Nuclear 
Complex - a Triga Mark II Reactor - that started with a power of 250 kW; the power of 
this reactor was increased to 1000 kW in 1971 and further to 2000 kW in the year 
2000.219 It was during this period that President Sukarno announced his intention for 
Indonesia to develop a nuclear weapon; however this was short-lived, and the project 
terminated in 1966. In 1966, the Pasar Jumat Nuclear Complex was constructed, and 
was followed by the adoption of IAEA comprehensive safeguards in 1967.220 Nuclear 
Technology Research Center of GAMA, Yogyakarta, which has housed the Kartini 
research reactor since it became fully operational in 1979, was established in1974. The 
Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor came online in 1987 at the Serprong 
Nuclear Complex, which also contains facilities for the production of radioisotopes and 
radiopharmaceuticals, fuel fabrication for both research and power reactors, and the 
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management of radioactive waste.221 Throughout this history, Indonesia achieved 
several fuel cycle capabilities, including uranium conversion and fuel fabrication for its 
research reactors.222 
 
Interest in introducing nuclear power to Indonesia’s energy mix has been ongoing and 
cyclical. In the mid-1970s, 14 potential nuclear power plant sites were proposed by the 
Location Sub-committee of the Nuclear Power Plant Construction Preparation 
Committee (KPP-PLTN).223 In a two-year survey from 1978-1979, a joint feasibility 
study was conducted by BATAN and Nucleare Italiana Reattori Aavanzati (NIRA), 
which identified the Muria Peninsula as the most suitable.224 However, opposition from 
the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance prevented further advancement of any 
plans.225 Conducted in1991-1996 by Japanese consulting company NEWJEC, the Site 
and Environmental Study on Muria identified three appropriate areas on the Muria 
Peninsula in their feasibility study – Ujung Lemahabang and Ujung Grenggengan near 
the village of Balong; and Ujung Watu, a few kilometres east of Balong.226 Once again, 
the study did not lead to action. The plan was thwarted by the 1997 Asian financial 
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crisis and the political and economic collapse that followed.227 In 1997, Russia 
announced its intentions to develop floating nuclear power plants, and planned to 
supply them to states that have outlying islands or coastal communities where 
electricity is not available on current supply lines, such as Indonesia and China.228 
Although the reactors did not begin construction until 2007, Jakarta newspaper Antara 
reported in 2003 that the State Minister for Research and Technology stated, “Russia 
has offered us a floating nuclear power plant”.229  
 
More recently, plans to construct a nuclear power plant in Indonesia have been revived. 
Several cooperation agreements have been reached, including an agreement with Russia 
in 2006, and a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) with Medco Energy 
International and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) to build Indonesia’s first 
nuclear power plant.230 In 2006, the Indonesian government announced plans to begin 
construction on a 4,000MW nuclear power plant by 2010 with an intended completion 
date of 2016.231  
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The recent move towards nuclear energy in Indonesia has been driven by an increased 
need for energy supply, and has been supported by the IAEA.232 However, there has 
been strong public opposition to the move toward nuclear power. Particular concerns 
have been raised regarding the geological instability of the proposed site, and the 
competence of authorities to handle safety and security aspects and manage nuclear 
waste. In 2007, a traditional Indonesian Islamic meeting, bahtsul masa’il, was held at 
the Nahdlatul Ulama headquarters in Jepara, a town in north Central Java to discuss the 
proposal for a nuclear power plant on the Muria Peninsula. The meeting was attended 
by more than 100 regional Islamic leaders, government ministers, senior officials, 
scientists, lawyers, sociologists, and activists, both for and against the government’s 
plan for the Muria nuclear power plant. Outside, thousands of protestors waited; several 
thousand had marched overnight from the village of Balong, where the nuclear plant 
was planned, to make their voices heard.233 At the conclusion of the meeting, the 
Islamic leaders announced a fatwa (Islamic ruling) on the Muria Peninsula project 
decrying it as haram (forbidden), much to the surprise of the Government and the 
nuclear industry.234 For the world’s largest Islamic population, such a decree holds 
great influence over public opinion. In the lead up to the election later that year, 
candidates backed away from the subject entirely. However, shortly before the election 
the plan to have the first nuclear reactor online in 2016 was still on track according to 
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the retiring Minister for Research and Technology.235 Just after the election, his 
successor confirmed his support for the nuclear project, stating: “the plan to build the 
nuclear power plant must go on”; the heads of BATAN and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Agency (BAPETEN) reiterated their long-standing appeals for “a nuclear answer to 
Indonesia’s chronic electricity difficulties.”236  
Indonesia’s response to the international fuel cycle proposals 
On the issue of multilateral nuclear approaches, Indonesia has remained relatively 
cautious in its response. First and foremost, governmental statements at NPT 
Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference since ElBaradei’s 2003 
article have simply reiterated the importance of maintaining the existing “inalienable 
right” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the 2004 NPT Prep-Com, Indonesian 
statements emphasised “the importance of ensuring the inalienable rights of all states 
Parties … to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. These right[s] must be fully 
protected at all times and no States Party should be limited in the exercise of this right 
in accordance with the Treaty.”237 At the 2007 NPT Prep-Com, Indonesia made 
comments that were slightly more poignant, restating the right of each country to 
choose to utilise peaceful nuclear energy, and that this choice should be respected 
“without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and 
arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.”238 
                                                 
235
 Richard Tanter, Arabella Imhoff, and David Von Hippel, "Nuclear Power, Risk Management and 
Democratic Accountability in Indonesia: Volcanic, regulatory and financial risk in the Muria peninsula 
nuclear power proposal," The Asia-Pacific Journal 51, no. 1 (21 December 2009), 5. 
236
 Ibid. 
237
 Indonesia, "Intervention by the Delegation of Indonesia at the Third Session of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference," (2004), 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/indonesiaCL2.pdf. Accessed 12 February 2009. 
238
 "Statement by Ambassador Triyono Wibowo at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 
2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons," (2007), 
 69 
Further, Indonesia argued that for NNWS, the ability to make the choice to pursue 
peaceful nuclear activities may be “crucial to the achievement of energy security and 
energy independence”, and although some believe that dual-use technologies need more 
restriction, excessive controls “may unfairly deprive developing countries of nuclear 
energy and technology,” which they are entitled to under the NPT.239 
 
It is clear that Indonesia believes the IAEA should be at the centre of any multilateral 
fuel cycle arrangement, strengthening the NPT by “closing the loopholes of the aspirant 
proliferators and non-state actors through a multilateral process. In this regard, 
enhancing the role of the IAEA, as nuclear energy promoter and nuclear proliferation 
preventer, has become imperative.”240 
 
In 2005, Indonesia held the international workshop, “Iran and Indonesia’s Nuclear 
Issue”, which examined the Iranian nuclear issue from an Indonesian perspective. 
Conference speakers included Ambassadors from Indonesia, Iran, and Russia, as well 
as representatives from BATAN and the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.241 
Indonesian Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat emphasised the rights of all 
member states of the IAEA and parties to the NPT, including Iran, to develop peaceful 
nuclear energy, but stressed the importance of adhering to IAEA Safeguards including 
the Additional Protocol.242 Ambassador Parnohadiningrat urged that the Iranian nuclear 
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situation needed to be addressed multilaterally and peacefully, rather than by the 
coercive arm of any single state.243 Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs director 
Ratu Silvy Gayatri underlined the importance of all NPT States Parties to comply with 
their obligations; the failure to do so presents a potential serious blow to the NPT 
regime.244 
 
At the 2009 IAEA General Conference, Indonesia’s representative expressed the 
opinion that any multilateral arrangement, “which would also guarantee the assurance 
of nuclear fuel supply”, should complement other efforts to strengthen the regime.245 
Once again, the statement highlighted the need to prevent multilateral arrangements 
from hindering the rights of states to access and develop peaceful nuclear science and 
technology.246  
 
As a founding member of NAM, statements from this group, particularly those 
delivered by Indonesia, are also relevant in the context of this thesis. At the 2009 NPT 
Preparatory Committee, Indonesia, on behalf of NAM, stated on the issue of assurance 
of nuclear fuel supply, that “extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations” 
are needed before this issue is considered by the international community.247 NAM 
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rejected the notion that certain peaceful nuclear activities should be discouraged due to 
their “alleged sensitivity”.248 
 
The strong belief that is held in Indonesia regarding the right to peaceful nuclear 
activities is emphasised by examples of the country’s attitude and actions over the 
Iranian nuclear issue. In a statement to the Security Council in March 2007, Indonesia 
voted in favour of Resolution 1747, emphasizing that should Iran comply, the measures 
specified in Resolution 1737 (2006) would be terminated. Indonesia stressed that “the 
solution to the issue of Iran should in no way affect or change the inalienable rights of 
all parties to the NPT, including Iran, to develop and research the production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”249 In 2008, Indonesia noted that although states 
are guaranteed the right to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy, there is no 
guarantee of the security of supply of technology or materials. In their endeavour to 
create such security indigenously, states are viewed with suspicion.250 Indonesia 
suggested that multilateral arrangements for assuring nuclear fuel supply may provide a 
way to solve this problem.251 The statement also emphasised Iran’s progress in 
cooperating with the IAEA. Subsequently, Indonesia abstained on the vote on 
Resolution 1803 (2008), which imposed sanctions on Iran.252  
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Indonesia has reacted with much caution, and remains suspicious that the multilateral 
approaches on offer may be a way for nuclear supplier states to exert further control 
over the international nuclear industry, by restricting who can have certain nuclear 
facilities. Indonesia has firmly defended the right of all states to develop nuclear 
energy, without conditions, and without discrimination of any kind.  
Case study three: Norway 
Norway has a history as an active promoter of international peace, arms control, nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation. Multilateral nuclear approaches fit with Norway’s 
broader foreign policy objectives by increasing the security of fissile materials and the 
transparency of nuclear activities. With no need to develop nuclear power as an energy 
source, Norway has nothing to lose by supporting multilateral approaches, and thus its 
consideration of the issue is ideological, rather than practical. For this reason, Norway’s 
response is representative of those states that will take a principled, rather than 
pragmatic, stance on this issue.  
Norway’s nuclear history 
Norway was the sixth state to build a nuclear reactor, an experimental reactor that went 
critical in 1951. Although there are indications that Norway had some interest in 
developing both nuclear weapons and nuclear power early on in the nuclear age, this 
never turned into definite plans, largely due to a lack of uranium resources and trained 
scientists. However, Norway still had a number of nuclear-related activities. During the 
1940s and 1950s, Norway produced heavy water as a by-product of the production of 
fertilizer,253 and exported this to France in 1940 and Israel in 1959.254 In 1948, the 
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Institutt for Atomenergi (currently known as the Institute for Energy Technology, IFE) 
was established at Kjeller, and three years later the JEEP I reactor went critical.255 Over 
the next 15 years, three more research reactors came online, however buy 1970 the 
JEEP I and NORA reactors had been shutdown and were being decommissioned.256 As 
early as 1955, Norwegian scientists had developed a technique for separating 
Plutonium, which continued until the 1970s. Also during the 1950s, there was much 
interest in the concept of atomic naval propulsion. In fact, this was the principal task of 
the Institute of Atomic Energy.257 
Norway’s response to the international fuel cycle proposals 
The Norwegian response to the multilateral fuel cycle proposals reflects the view that 
such approaches can help to reconcile peaceful uses with global non-proliferation 
concerns by ensuring that a nuclear renaissance does not undermine the non-
proliferation regime or threaten human safety and the environment.258 Norway supports 
several initiatives, such as that put forward by Germany, to develop international 
cooperation on fuel production and waste management, and the IAEA-NTI fuel bank.259 
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In 2004, the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change recommended in its report that states should “voluntarily institute a time-
limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing 
facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply 
of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates.”260 At the time, Norway was 
one of the few state supporters of this recommendation, calling for a moratorium on the 
construction of “facilities for sensitive technologies” in October at the UN First 
Committee.261  
 
Statements in international forums have vocalised Norway’s support for multilateral 
fuel cycle approaches. A 2005 Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) Ministerial statement 
welcomed the IAEA Expert Group report, and recommended the establishment of 
mechanisms to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel and fuel cycle services for non-
proliferation compliant states.262 At the 2007 NPT Prep-Com, Norway submitted a 
working paper, in which it advocated the renewal of international efforts for a 
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, welcomed the work that has been done 
to “develop international fuel-supply guarantees and acknowledged the progress made 
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in establishing international centres of excellence at shared facilities”.263 In September 
2007, Norway’s statement to the IAEA General Conference further indicated support 
for multilateral approaches, arguing that they offered a “potential accommodation of 
our energy needs and our non-proliferation concerns.”264 Norway urged member states 
and the IAEA to move forward with discussions on the fuel cycle with greater 
urgency.265  
 
Perhaps the most significant response has been Norway’s financial contribution to the 
IAEA-NTI Fuel Bank. In February 2008, it was announced at the high-level 
international conference, “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” 
in Oslo, that Norway would contribute US$5 million to the plan.266 Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre described the fuel bank as a “concrete and effective step” in 
support of global non-proliferation and disarmament goals.267 Foreign Minister Støre 
has been very vocally supportive of multilateral approaches for a few years now, 
promoting them in his speech at ElBaradei’s Nobel Prize ceremony in 2005. 
 
Norway is a prominent multilateral actor in a number of areas, and has played a key 
role within the international community in this respect, chairing the Iraq sanctions 
committee, the Seven Nations Initiative, the UNHCR’s executive board, and the 
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Peacebuilding Commission’s country-specific working group. Norway’s reputation for 
neutrality and good intentions gives actions such as its contribution to the IAEA-NTI 
Fuel Bank weight.268  
Case study four: South Korea 
South Korea is a crucial state for any consideration of nuclear energy issues, primarily 
due to its role within the ongoing nuclear tension in Northeast Asia. South Korea has a 
long history of nuclear activities; however, its ability to engage in the full fuel cycle has 
been limited because of the proliferation risks posed by spent fuel reprocessing. By 
undertaking this stage of the fuel cycle, South Korea could escalate its already fraught 
relationship with North Korea. This leaves South Korea with a problem: what to do 
with its spent fuel. Thus, adopting a multilateral nuclear approach may alleviate a 
number of issues, and increase transparency and trust on the Korean Peninsula.   
South Korea’s nuclear history 
In the mid-1950s, South Korea and the Unites States signed “the Agreement of 
Cooperation between the Governments of South Korea and the United States 
Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy”, which was quickly followed by the 
establishment of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Ministry of Education.269 South 
Korea became a member of the IAEA in 1957, and in 1962 its first nuclear reactor, a 
TRIGA research reactor from the US, achieved criticality.270 One decade later, the 
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construction of its first nuclear power plant began, reaching criticality in 1977 and 
achieving commercial operation in 1978.271 This plant was a turnkey project with the 
US, where the contractors are responsible for the plant’s construction and 
performance.272 Two additional turnkey reactors were ordered in 1973 and 1974, from 
Canada and the US respectively.273 During the 1980s, six more nuclear power plants 
were constructed. Instead of using the turnkey approach, the involvement of domestic 
industries increased by separately contracting the plant’s components.274  
 
In 1987, South Korea began a technical transfer programme to achieve nuclear 
technical self-reliance.275 The evolution of South Korean nuclear power plant designs 
testifies to this programme. Its initial eight Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) drew 
from Westinghouse and Framatome (now AREVA) technologies, and its next two, 
from Combustion Engineering, which eventually became part of Westinghouse. 
Following this, the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KNSP) became a recognized 
design in its own right and evolved to the KNSP+ in the 1990s.276 In 2005, these units 
were rebranded as Optimized Power Reactors (OPR-1000). Currently six of these units 
are operating and four are under construction.277 These units and the Advanced 
Pressurized Reactors (APR-400) are being actively marketed in the Middle East and 
North Africa. In December 2009, the APR-400 was selected for the United Arab 
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Emirates nuclear power programme. Under a US$20.4 billion contract, 14 reactors will 
be constructed, the first of which is planned to be operational in 2020. 
 
Domestically, South Korea has 20 operational power reactors, and another 12 either 
under construction, on order, or planned. The first reactor, KORI-1, will be closed in 
2017. Fuel for these reactors is currently imported, largely from Australia and Canada, 
although the state has increasing involvement in uranium exploration in Canada, and 
uranium mines in Africa and South America.278 In 2007, KHNP signed a long-term 
contract with AREVA, for the provision of enrichment services at France’s Georges-
Besse II plant. As of 2009, KHNP also has a 2.5% equity stake in the plant.279 
 
The Korea-US Agreement constrains South Korea’s ability to fully engage in nuclear 
fuel cycle activities. Specifically, reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is prohibited. 
However, the transportation costs of overseas reprocessing is too expensive to be a 
viable option. Thus, South Korea has embarked on a number of research and 
development projects looking at ways to reduce and reuse reactor waste. These include 
the DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In Candu reactors) programme, the 
Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP), and pyroprocessing. 280 
 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has formulated a Comprehensive 
Nuclear Energy Promotion Plan (CNEPP) every five years since 1997. The Third 
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CNEPP, for 2007-2011, envisions nuclear energy as the future primary driver of 
growth. To this end, the development of SMART,281 increasing the industry for export 
of nuclear-related items, and developing nonproliferation fuel cycle technology are key 
points on the agenda.282  
South Korea’s response to the international fuel cycle proposals 
In the lead-up to the 2007 NPT Prep-Com, South Korean Ambassador Choi Young-jin 
gave a presentation at a panel on the nuclear fuel cycle at the Middle Powers Initiative 
Article VI Forum in Vienna. During his presentation, the Ambassador described the 
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle as “an idea whose time has come.”283 He 
argued that in order for such a regime to become successful, states must consider an 
“enlightened national interest as opposed to classic narrow national self-interest”.284 
That is, states should consider what is in the best interest of all states, rather than just 
direct national interest.  
 
At the 2007 NPT Prep-Com, South Korea submitted a working paper with Canada and 
France, which called the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approaches “another facet” for 
the non-proliferation regime.285 Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International 
Organisations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated: 
“Given the nexus between proliferation dangers and sensitive fuel-cycle technologies 
and facilities, we recognize the need to control their transfer, particularly to countries of 
proliferation concern or those countries that have no legitimate need for such 
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technologies and facilities in terms of their economic feasibility or energy security. We 
believe that ironclad guarantees of a secure fuel supply at a reasonable price should be 
provided to those countries that voluntarily forgo the possession of sensitive fuel-cycle 
facilities.”286  
This statement is telling of Korea’s position on this issue; countries that pose a greater 
risk of proliferation, or have better energy options, should not have open access to all 
facets of nuclear technology.  
 
During the 2008 NPT Prep-Com, Canada, France and South Korea submitted a very 
similar working paper to that of 2007, this time with Estonia, Poland, Romania, 
Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Although multilateral fuel cycle approaches were 
addressed with more brevity than in the proceeding year, they were described in the 
paper as “a framework for the safe, secure, and proliferation-resistance development of 
nuclear energy applications.”287 
 
At the 2009 NPT Prep-Com, the South Korean working paper of 6 May highlighted the 
country’s dependence on nuclear energy in its domestic energy mix, and because of this 
South Korea “fully supports international efforts to realize the goals and spirit of 
initiatives on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, and is willing to 
constructively participate in discussions on this subject.”288 On 8 May at the same 
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conference, South Korean Ambassador Kim Bong-hyun highlighted the country’s 
participation in such multilateral activities as the GEN VI Forum, GNEP, and the 
IAEA’s International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and 
Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA). The Ambassador commended the leading 
role the IAEA had taken in regard to the multilateral proposals, and noted South 
Korea’s financial contribution to research on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel 
cycle currently being undertaken at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research (UNIDIR).289  
 
In June, South Korea released a non-paper entitled “The Republic of Korea’s 
Suggestion on Possible Criteria for Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, 
which stated the international community’s need to seek “effective approaches to 
address the proliferation risk resulting from access to sensitive nuclear fuel 
technologies by an increasing number of countries.”290 The paper suggested an 
incentive-based approach, offering constant economically attractive prices, as well as 
full fuel cycle services including the back-end, “in exchange for voluntary commitment 
to refrain from seeking sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities for an extended period”, 
reflecting the need to balance rights and obligations for all states.291 
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These four case studies have similar nuclear backgrounds, yet differing nuclear 
aspirations; their responses to the proposals on multilateral nuclear fuel cycle 
approaches reflect this difference. However, other factors influence their perspectives 
on this issue, and the following chapter will discuss the effect of the way in which 
critical states process an emerging norm has on its eventual emergence or failure.  
 83 
Chapter Five: Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Approaches as 
an International Norm 
For the most part, analysis of norms theory in international relations has focussed its 
attention on historical cases; analysts have used examples of successful and salient 
norms, with relatively little attention given to emerging, changing or failed norms.292 
This gap in the understanding of how and why certain norms become salient and others 
do not means that international actors have limited available strategies to use in order to 
strengthen support for emerging norms. From an academic perspective, this gap leaves 
norms literature endlessly backward looking, unable to speculate about the future. As 
part of the broader aims of this thesis, this chapter attempts to bridge part of this gap, by 
analysing the state responses to the recent multilateral proposals as part of the 
emergence of a new norm. What do the reactions of the case study states indicate about 
the multilateral approach as an international norm? Do these reactions reveal stages of 
norm development within the norm life cycle? What is motivating or leading these 
states to react in the way each has? What has influenced the norm processing of each 
state? Why do the most critical states remain unconvinced? What are the consequences 
for them of accepting such a concept in regards to their own Article IV rights? 
Multilateral nuclear approaches have been put forward at various times during the 
nuclear age, and have never received the level of support that they are currently 
experiencing. This chapter will discuss the factors that have lead to this increased 
support for the case study states, suggesting the potential for this emerging norm to 
become salient.  
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An emerging norm? 
There are three primary indications of the emergence of multilateral nuclear approaches 
as an international norm. Following Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle, the first 
is the existence of a norm entrepreneur with an international organisational platform. 
The second is the positive responses of three of the four critical states identified in this 
thesis. The third indication is the progress that has been made on transforming the 
proposals into reality. However, negative indications are also present. The concerns 
raised by Indonesia that multilateral approaches may infringe on the NPT Article IV 
rights of States Parties reflect the reasons identified as inhibitors of previous attempts to 
introduce multilateral nuclear frameworks.  
 
While the origins of the multilateral approach can be identified as early as the 1940s, 
interest generated through ElBaradei’s reintroduction of the idea in 2003 has for the 
first time resulted in genuine interest from states. ElBaradei’s successful efforts to 
gather further support since then is reflective of both his own credibility within the 
international community and the strength of the concern surrounding both the Iranian 
situation and the nuclear renaissance. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle, 
ElBaradei can be identified as a norm entrepreneur, with an international organisation 
as a platform for communication and credibility. In 2003, his article in The Economist 
outlined his proposal for a new nuclear framework in three parts. First, he suggested a 
limit on the processing of weapons-usable material in civilian nuclear energy 
programmes, as well as on the production of new material, by restricting these 
operations exclusively to multinational facilities. Second, nuclear-energy systems 
should have built-in features that would prevent diversion of nuclear material to 
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weapons production. This would involve the development of, for example, new nuclear 
facilities that would not separate plutonium from spent fuel. Third, there should be 
serious consideration of multinational approaches to the management and disposal of 
spent fuel and radioactive waste. These initiatives would be advantageous on multiple 
levels, he argued, by reducing the cost of nuclear-energy systems and therefore making 
them available to “more people in more countries”; increasing the physical security of 
nuclear facilities; and increasing non-proliferation controls by limiting access to 
weapons-grade material. ElBaradei also added that the new framework should be 
inclusive of nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, and those outside the 
current regime. 
 
ElBaradei took a number of subsequent steps to propel the multilateral fuel cycle 
concept back into the international spotlight. This included presenting his ideas at the 
15th Annual Conference of the Indian Nuclear Society in November 2004, emphasizing 
the potential for inclusion of non-NPT States in multilateral initiatives; convening an 
international Expert Group, chaired by former IAEA Deputy Director Bruno Pellard, to 
consider possible multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle; and organising an 
IAEA Special Event, “New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy in the 
21st Century: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation”, in September 2006.293 
 
In contrast with historical attempts to introduce multilateral approaches into the 
international community, ElBaradei has managed to draw significant interest from a 
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number of states. Following his initial steps to advocate for multilateral nuclear 
approaches, a number of states indicated their support by drafting proposals for 
multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives, as outlined in chapter three. Chapter Four 
demonstrated the outright support for specific initiatives from Australia, Norway, and 
South Korea, contrasting with the caution of Indonesia’s response. Within the norm life 
cycle, this mixed response indicates that the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel 
cycle is an emerging norm, competing against the existing salient norm of indigenous 
control and development of the full nuclear fuel cycle. However, this alone does not 
necessarily mean that multilateral approaches will reach the tipping point, and become 
an internalised, widely held belief.  
Norm processing 
The way in which a state processes a norm and the motivations for accepting or 
supporting the norm varies according to the stage of the life cycle. During ‘emergence’, 
states are persuaded by the norm entrepreneur. This differs from latter stages, when the 
norm acquires the ‘oughtness’ quality that norms are most well-recognised for.294 
Contestation between existing normative and social structures is an intrinsic part of the 
norm life cycle process, where old practices and new ideas clash and compete for 
dominance. This occurs during the emergence stage of the life cycle, and helps to 
explain why only a small number of states embrace the norm in the beginning. 
Motivations for accepting new international norms during emergence are altruistic or 
self-interested. As the emerging norm is supported by an increasing number of states 
and reaches the tipping point, institutionalisation and demonstration of the norm’s 
benefits help to motivate support of additional states. As this happens, the social costs 
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of remaining outside the norm increase. Thus, those resistant to the idea in the 
beginning may eventually find themselves in an environment where rejecting the norm 
has more negative social consequences than when they first rejected the idea. In this 
case, the processes of demonstration and institutionalisation have already begun. The 
Russian IUEC initiative has gained initial shareholders and is attracting the attention of 
prospective members, including India. After reaching its financial milestone in 2009, 
the NTI proposal for an IAEA Fuel Bank has also become a step closer to reality after 
the IAEA Board of Directors approved a Russian proposal to locate the reserve on 
Russian Soil in November 2009.295 Examples of successful, functioning multilateral 
nuclear fuel cycle initiatives will enhance their credibility and stimulate further support 
by previously wary states. 
Case Studies 
There are some supporting states for which embracing the norm is relatively easy. 
Norway is one such example, as a state without nuclear power aspirations that has a 
strong history of supporting non-proliferation and, more broadly, international peace 
initiatives. For states such as Norway, the cost-benefit calculation for this norm 
involves many benefits at a cost that is affordable. Norway’s response can be assumed 
to reflect that of the states that can afford to take a purely ideological stance. With 
abundant hydropower supply, an already developed population, and security provided 
through NATO’s nuclear arrangements, Norway’s consideration of this issue can rest 
solely on non-proliferation grounds.  
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For Australia, the calculation is also weighted towards the benefit side. Multilateral 
nuclear fuel cycle approaches provide it with an opportunity to expand its nuclear 
industry and increase exports of uranium yellowcake. There is additional potential for 
uranium to be enriched on Australian soil in a multilateral facility. Naturally, there is 
some financial costs involved, but the benefits are clear. Uranium oxide is a significant 
export for Australia. Uranium exports ranked 13th of Australia’s top mineral and fuel 
exports in 2008, valued at $736 million.296 If uranium enrichment or fuel fabrication 
could be added to the mix, the value of this export will increase. With so many states 
looking to adopt nuclear power, the market for fuel cycle services, including provision 
of enriched uranium for reactor fuel, is wide open for new players. There are currently 
only five companies that provide over 90% of worldwide enrichment services.297 In 
2005, 12360 tonnes of uranium yellowcake (U3O8) was exported from Australia, valued 
at A$573 million. However, if these exports had been enriched uranium instead of 
uranium yellowcake, their value would have been A$1140 million.298 Naturally, there 
would be additional costs involved with creating the higher value product; however, 
with Australia’s large uranium reserves, investing in fuel cycle facilities may pay itself 
off reasonably quickly. A briefing paper by Nuclear Fuel Australia Ltd, The Case for 
Uranium Enrichment in Australia, suggests that because Australia has the most 
stringent safeguards requirements for uranium supply, has already developed both 
centrifuge and laser enrichment technologies, and is a major exporter of uranium, the 
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construction of a conversion plant and uranium enrichment facility would be 
beneficial.299  
 
When the topic of nuclear power in Australia was raised by Prime Minister Howard 
towards the end of his term in office, it was controversial and received a divided public 
response. On one hand, Australia’s energy needs are currently being met through the 
use of coal, which Australia has in abundance as the world’s largest coal exporter, and 
fourth largest coal producer.300 For the year 2007-2008, around 75 per cent of 
Australia’s electricity was generated through coal.301 Although coal is not a clean 
energy, it is available at low cost, and the size of Australian coal reserves will allow 
this to be the case for many years to come. Thus, the need for an alternative, costly, and 
as seen by many, dangerous source of energy is not apparent. On the other hand, the 
Australia nuclear industry is keen to expand its horizons. 
 
Australia wanted to be one of the “advanced states”, nuclear fuel cycle suppliers, in 
Bush’s GNEP framework. At the time, Howard was proactively engaging Australia on 
its nuclear future through the UMPNER Review. As a state with substantial uranium 
resources, it would make sense to develop more fuel cycle facilities domestically if 
nuclear power became part of the energy mix in the future. The proposals for a nuclear 
waste repository equally fall under this umbrella: useful if Australia intends on utilising 
nuclear power, but the lack of broad public support for this energy option makes 
nuclear fuel cycle expansion controversial. Acceptance of the idea that some states 
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should not have enrichment or reprocessing facilities also motivated its membership in 
GNEP. Howard had a positive relationship with former-President Bush, who had 
referred to Australia as a “regional sheriff”. Since the election of Kevin Rudd and the 
Labor Party, the Government has publicly backed away from nuclear topics. The 
National Radioactive Waste Management Bill 2010 is currently under debate, as the 
Labor Party seeks to replace the Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act 
2005. The difference between the two is that the 2005 Act sought to create a national 
waste repository, while the 2010 Bill seeks to establish a single national facility for the 
management of low-level and short-lived radioactive medical and scientific waste.302 
The new government has nonetheless remains a member of GNEP. 
 
Similarly for South Korea, the benefits of being involved in a multilateral fuel cycle 
arrangement are obvious, given the limitations it faces in regards to an expansion of the 
nuclear industry. This is currently limited through the US-Korea Arrangement, set to 
expire in 2014, and is a delicate matter due to the North Korea situation. Yet, as a state 
with advanced nuclear capabilities and a good record of nuclear safety, it may be a 
good candidate for facilitating a multilateral approach in the Asia-Pacific region. Like 
Australia, South Korea may have jumped on board with GNEP partly as a 
precautionary measure, wanting to negate classification as a “customer” instead of an 
“advanced nuclear supplier state” and in doing so, trying to ensure that its rights to 
access nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes remain status quo. South 
Korea has shown interest and made a large investment in developing its domestic 
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nuclear power programme, which provides around 50% of the country’s energy needs. 
The inability to employ reprocessing activities has led to innovative projects on 
reprocessing alternatives and nuclear waste solutions, as the nation’s spent fuel builds 
up with nowhere to go, as offshore reprocessing is too expensive to be a viable option. 
These factors, plus its membership in the Generation IV International Forum, 
demonstrate its position as an advanced nuclear state. Yet the security situation on the 
Korean Peninsula and corresponding tensions in North Asia may lead some to believe 
South Korea is a risky state in which to have the enrichment and reprocessing stages of 
the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, the latent nuclear capability that results from these 
technologies may increase existing regional tensions. For example, a nuclear-capable 
South Korea could lead to an escalation of the nuclear or military activities of China or 
North Korea, regardless of whether the threat they perceive is real or imagined. By the 
same margin, South Korea’s desire to be at the forefront of nuclear technology may in 
part be fuelled by a desire to ward-off threats by North Korea, whose efforts in the 
nuclear realm have been hampered in part by a lack of technological ability.  
 
The cost-benefit calculation for Indonesia includes some additional factors that render 
cost a heavier burden than the potential benefits. As a founding member of the NAM, 
Indonesia has traditionally been a staunch critic of Western efforts to exert control over 
the international community, and has been outspoken about its perception that the NWS 
have not done enough to live up to their Article VI NPT obligations. Indonesia is 
currently considering the nuclear power option, and as enrichment and reprocessing are 
expensive endeavours, one might think a multilateral arrangement may be economically 
attractive to a developing nation. The issue is that some of the proposals have a 
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condition on participation: the ‘client’ state must forgo the right to such activities 
before it can gain the benefits. Although this is not a requirement of all proposals, 
former President Bush framed the multilateral initiatives as condition in February 2004 
during a speech at the National Defense Academy.303 In states such as Indonesia, this 
condition is viewed with disdain. Why should states with long records of safe, 
proliferation-free peaceful nuclear activities give up rights afforded to them under the 
NPT, when the states that are dictating this course of action have worked so slowly on 
their own obligations under the same treaty? Indonesia holds the principles of 
sovereignty, independence, and self-determination in high regard, reflected in the 1973 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed between the founding members of ASEAN, as 
well as its membership in NAM. This viewpoint has motivated its vocal advocacy of 
Iran’s right to engage in peaceful nuclear activities.304 Because of this, it seems unlikely 
that Indonesia would be open to engaging with the current multilateral fuel cycle 
proposals on the table, due to the ongoing inaccurate perception that in order to 
participate in any such initiative, states are required to forgo enrichment and 
reprocessing rights. 
 
However, this is not to say that such reluctance will continue indefinitely. Cooperation 
among Southeast Asian nations, under the principles of respect for sovereignty, 
continues to positively reinforce stability within the region. Certainly from an economic 
perspective, the realities of the high cost of an indigenous nuclear programme including 
enrichment and/or reprocessing have hindered attempts to begin such an effort in the 
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past, although this has not prevented strong research and medical programmes. Despite 
its concerns about the right to access, it may be wise for Indonesian officials to consider 
scenarios where Southeast Asian multilateral nuclear cooperation may be workable, 
perhaps with assistance from Australia and South Korea for enrichment and 
reprocessing.  
 
Indonesia has a real need for increased power generation capacity, as “its public 
utilities have never generated enough electricity to meet demand from households and 
industry, and in recent years the shortfall in production has become more serious.”305 
However, its geographic position on the “Ring of Fire” and subsequently high amount 
of seismic activity presents a major safety concern for this densely population 
archipelago, as any nuclear accidents that may result from a seismic event may have 
grave domestic and international consequences. Given the dense population of 
Indonesia and close proximity of its neighbours, adequate preparation for dealing with a 
nuclear accident must take a high priority. This may come in the form of a regional 
nuclear emergency response team, or coordinated training for nuclear power plant staff.  
International security considerations 
One interesting point to note is the fact that three of the four case study states, those 
that have reacted positively toward the multilateral fuel cycle initiatives, are all 
protected by nuclear weapons. Australia is protected by the US under the ANZUS 
Treaty, Norway is protected by the US under the NATO alliance, and Korea is also 
protected under the US nuclear umbrella. Indonesia, on the other hand, is afforded no 
such protection. In fact, the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) 
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includes protocols that the NWS can sign, undertaking to respect the treaty and not to 
contribute to any act in violation of the treaty or its protocol by States Parties, or to use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party or within the SEANWFZ.306 
While it seems unlikely that Indonesia’s intentions in defending the right to maintain 
existing rights to access peaceful nuclear technology are part of a long-term plan to 
develop its own nuclear protection, being non-aligned and unprotected by and from 
nuclear weapons impacts on Indonesia’s processing of the multilateral fuel cycle norm.  
NPT rights and obligations 
The refusal by the NWS to sign the SEANWFZ protocols, coupled with the perceived 
lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, could be seen as actions that are contrary to 
the spirit of the NPT. From the perspective of many non-aligned states, NWS have not 
lived up to their end of the bargain. NNWS are highly likely to resist efforts to further 
restrict their access to technology, knowledge and equipment, without a concerted 
effort to put disarmament goals and principles into action. At the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference, “13 Practical Steps” were agreed upon as a path leading to general and 
complete nuclear disarmament. These steps included obtaining the remaining signatures 
and ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the negotiation of a 
non-discriminatory, verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material; entry 
into force and full implementation of START II and conclusion of START III 
negotiations; and direct steps by the nuclear weapons states leading to disarmament, 
including reductions in nuclear arsenals, increased transparency in regards to nuclear 
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capabilities, and reductions in non-strategic weapons.307 Almost ten years later, the 13 
Steps have had only limited success. The CTBT still requires ratification by many of 
the Annex II States in order to come into force, including China and the US. The 
Conference on Disarmament has finally agreed to a programme of work including 
negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, but is yet to begin 
work.  
 
The lack of progress on steps that were agreed to by consensus at the 2000 Review 
Conference presents a key challenge for states trying to push the multilateral fuel cycle 
concept – change cannot be accomplished via diktat; it will require bargaining.308 
Developing states such as Brazil, China, India, Iran, and South Africa have more 
power, in both economic and political terms, and change in the international system is 
unlikely to succeed without their support.309 In addition to these States, smaller and less 
powerful countries are insistent on greater equality310 and will not accept greater 
discrimination within the NPT regime. As George Perkovich writes: 
“These eminent Americans along with Russian and French officials and experts act as 
if they were merely requesting an upgrade of the nuclear order software from 1.0 to 2.0. 
They fail to appreciate that key developing countries feel that the original software did 
not work well for them and that they received comparatively poor, indeed unfair, 
service from the original vendors. Not having benefited as fully as they expected from 
the original bargain, these developing countries do not want to sign a new contract for 
the purported upgrade they are being offered. And with the diffusion of technology 
anticipated in coming years, resembling the diffusion of open-source codes in computer 
software, they believe they have alternatives. A vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world 
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is not necessary to justify stronger controls on fuel-cycle technology, but it is absolutely 
necessary to achieve such controls.”311 
 
Indeed the case of Iran perhaps demonstrates the fears of other NNWS well. The IAEA 
has yet to find evidence that Iran has diverted nuclear material to a nuclear weapons 
programme. Despite many occurrences of non-compliance from failing to report its 
activities over their 18-year period, this, according to Michael Spies, “does not satisfy 
the criteria in the Safeguards Agreement allowing for the Agency to report the matter to 
the UN Security Council,”312 which may happen only in the instance that the IAEA 
Board of Governors is unable to verify a lack of diversion of nuclear material.313 It was 
this basis under which North Korea was referred in 2003.314 In the case of Iran, the 
Board’s referral was given under the broader language of Article III.B. of the IAEA 
Statute, which allows the IAEA to refer situations to the Security Council for “issues 
within the Security Council’s competence”,315 reasoning that the “absence of 
confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes ha[s] 
given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council.”316  
The NAM has generally supported Iran’s position, though with caution, perhaps with 
the premise of protecting their own rights under Article IV rather than the belief that 
Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.317 As Spies states, 
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although there are growing suspicions about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme 
and its intentions for the future, its violations “have not risen to the level where an 
argument can be made that Iran has forfeited its rights under Article IV.”318 Yet, the 
situation has gone before the Security Council, which has required Iran to stop its 
enrichment activities so that outstanding questions can be answered. 
 
The trouble with increasingly restrictive non-proliferation initiatives, vital as they may 
be, is the perception that they are also eroding the rights to peaceful nuclear activities 
afforded to NNWS under Article IV. Additionally, the very slow and small amount of 
disarmament progress from NWS hinders the acceptance of significant non-
proliferation measures, such as the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approaches, as 
NNWS are wary that the NPT regime may end up even more discriminatory than it 
originally intended. While multilateral approaches have great potential to shore up 
existing gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, some states are reluctant to jump 
on board, for many reasons. The existing gap between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, 
the potential for economic disadvantage, the perceived lack of progress on nuclear 
disarmament, a history of international control of peaceful nuclear technologies, and the 
need to protect existing Treaty rights all contribute to a feeling of distrust between 
advanced nuclear states and developing ones.   
                                                 
318
 Spies, "Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," 428.  
 98 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Peaceful or otherwise, the dual-use nature nuclear technology and materials has always 
rendered nuclear activities problematic. In recent years, the issue of promoting nuclear 
power while preventing nuclear weapons proliferation has been further complicated by 
the Iranian nuclear situation, and the impending “nuclear renaissance”. For the IAEA, 
multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle offer a way to navigate forward, 
protecting the rights of those states that choose to utilise nuclear energy, while 
simultaneously strengthening the weaknesses in the regime that have become all too 
apparent. The notion that nuclear fuel cycle activities should be a multilateral 
endeavour has unfortunately not gained international favour over indigenous 
approaches since its initial introduction into international forums in the early stages of 
the nuclear age. Various factors and concerns have prevented states from whole-hearted 
and widespread acceptance, despite periodic efforts through the IAEA to encourage 
internationalised nuclear cooperation.  
 
The concluding chapter of this thesis will address the degree to which norms theory 
explains increased support for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, suggest 
other measures that can be taken by norm leaders to transmit and activate this norm, 
highlight problems that will need to be addressed in order to increase support for 
multilateral approaches, and address the broader significance of this issue.  
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The normative explanation 
The traditional application of norms theory has identified salient international norms, 
retrospectively tracing their evolution. This thesis has taken a different approach, 
attempting to identify an emerging norm with the potential to become a new 
international norm. In addition, this thesis has drawn constructivist and realist 
approaches together in the theoretical assumption that during the emergence stage of 
the life cycle states have both ideological and self-interested reasons for supporting a 
new norm. When examined through the norm life cycle framework, it can be best 
concluded that multilateral approaches are still in the ‘emergence’ stage - yet to gain 
widespread support, but not without significant backing.  
 
The renewed interest that has been generated by ElBaradei, as a norm entrepreneur, 
clearly distinguishes it from past attempts to introduce multilateral nuclear controls. For 
the first time since the Baruch Plan and Atoms for Peace, states and international 
organisations have given serious consideration to the practical application of the 
multilateral approach. This resulted in the proposals outlined in Chapter Three, which 
identify the support of the global powers, including the US and Russia, whose support 
is crucial for norm development.  
 
The state responses to the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle proposals indicate enthusiasm 
from advanced, developed states, and caution from developing states. At present, 
support seems to be limited to advanced nuclear suppliers, states that have the luxury to 
take a purely ideological stance, such as Norway, or states that already are engaged in 
the nuclear industry, and thus have the potential to receive economic or technological 
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benefits from participating, such as Australia and South Korea. However, for states 
such as Indonesia, that intended to develop indigenous nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the 
prospect of being denied that option is a serious concern. Gaining the support of such 
states is critical for the development of this norm; without their cooperation, the norm 
will fail to reach the “tipping point” and normative change will not occur.  
 
Tangible progress in the nuclear paradigm that has been made recently reinforces the 
ideological push to change state practice in regard to the most sensitive aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. These developments include President Obama’s push toward nuclear 
disarmament, seen in the NPR and the Nuclear Summit held in April 2010; agreement 
on a Programme of Work in the Conference on Disarmament including a fissile 
material treaty in 2009; successful negotiations by Russia and the US on a START 
replacement, the Prague Treaty; Russia’s creation of the International Uranium 
Enrichment Center at Angarsk; and progress on the IAEA LEU fuel bank. That 
multilateral nuclear approaches will support other aspects of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime should provide some incentive for states to extend their support. 
The increased levels of nuclear safety and security achieved through multilateral 
approaches could encourage further progress on securing fissile materials. In turn may 
encourage more movement within the Conference on Disarmament, which until 2009 
had failed to pass a programme of work since 1995. Increased nuclear security will 
permit the recent momentum on nuclear disarmament to continue.  
 
Although the NPT guarantees states the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes, it is perhaps the case that this right needs to be conditional on “good 
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behaviour” in order to contribute to wider international security. On the other hand, 
there is a large degree of resistance from NNWS to further restrict their NPT rights 
while the disarmament progress of NWS remains, in their view, minimal.   
Multilateral nuclear approaches in the broader context 
The risks posed by the uncontrolled development of nuclear technologies are 
exemplified as worst-case scenarios by the ongoing situations in Iran and North Korea. 
In the case of Iran, the actual development of a deliverable nuclear weapon remains a 
risk rather than a reality. However, the twenty years of concealment from the IAEA, 
linkages to the military, constantly changing explanations according to the inspectors’ 
finding, refusal of access to the sites and to key information personnel when requested 
is uncharacteristic of peaceful civilian nuclear development.319 The Iranian case 
prompted reconsideration over the extent of access to peaceful nuclear technology, and 
the use of multilateral approaches to mitigate the risks such access poses, particularly, 
but not exclusively, for states of proliferation concern. In the context of an expansion in 
the use of nuclear power and corresponding increase in facilities to accommodate the 
demand for nuclear fuel cycle services, multilateral approaches may provide the best 
mechanism to alleviate risks while still enabling states to make national decisions 
regarding their energy security. 
 
The threat of nuclear terrorism not only arises from the potential for terrorists to acquire 
a nuclear weapons, or even radiological material for a “dirty bomb”; an attack on an 
insecure nuclear facility would likely be devastating enough to be a worthwhile target 
for terrorist groups or non-state actors. Multilateral facilities would bring more 
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standardisation to the security levels of nuclear facilities worldwide, with particular 
benefits for developing states that may have economic barriers preventing more than a 
minimal level of security. The same logic can be applied to the area of nuclear safety. A 
multilateral approach would ensure that facilities have properly trained staff, well-
maintained equipment, and ability to sufficiently respond to a nuclear incident or 
emergency.  
 
The security of fissile materials is an area of particular concern, even in developed 
states. Documented accounts of the attempted black market sale of HEU in Russia in 
2006, and the breech of a key national nuclear facility in South Africa in 2007 are just 
two examples.320 In Russia, old and damaged nuclear portal monitors, underpaid 
security staff, and an unstable electricity supply are major factors contributing to the 
ability for black market agents to acquire fissile material. Multilateral approaches 
would increase the available funding for nuclear checkpoints at border security, at least 
at particularly vulnerable locations, such as on the Russo-Georgian border.  
Implications for the real world  
Policy recommendations 
That the majority of the twelve proposals have come from ‘supplier’ states is indicative 
of a lack of consultation between these states and the developing non-nuclear states. 
The issues raised by developing states regarding the proposals, primarily concerning 
the requirement to forgo enrichment and reprocessing rights, need to be addressed, and 
new reworked proposals put forward. The requirement for states to give up these rights 
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is a somewhat unrealistic expectation, and unless there are significant incentives to do 
so, this will be a hindrance to the development of the multilateral approaches. This 
could be done through ad hoc international groups, or an IAEA working group.  
 
Placing the IAEA at the centre of any arrangement is key to gaining the trust of 
developing states that may be wary of multilateral arrangements impinging on their 
rights by overzealous ‘advanced’ nuclear states. This has been identified as an 
important factor by Indonesia, a state that has been careful to avoid any definitively 
positive statements on the issue. This would require additional funding for the IAEA; 
however, the involvement of the IAEA may prove to be a critical feature in any 
successful multilateral endeavour.  
 
The IAEA-NTI fuel bank has achieved its donation threshold, with US$100 million 
from member states activating the US$50 million from NTI. The proposal was stalled 
in the IAEA Board of Governors, with states lacking certainty about the whole idea; 
however, in 2009 the IAEA accepted an offer from Russia to host the fuel bank at its 
IUEC at Angarsk. Thus, this initiative needs further support from states, both in terms 
of supplying the actual fuel, and buy-in to the scheme. The US and Russia can take a 
leading step here, through the donation of LEU.  
 
The end of ElBaradei’s leadership at the IAEA signals an important role for norm 
leaders. ElBaradei’s role as a norm entrepreneur led to a greater level of international 
interest in multilateral nuclear approaches than ever before. Now that he no longer has 
the platform of the IAEA, “norm leaders” and other states that are in support of 
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multilateral approaches will need to establish international dialogue on this issue to 
ensure that it does not fall by the wayside. Linking multilateral nuclear approaches with 
non-proliferation and nuclear security is a vital task for norm leaders; the failure to do 
so may result in unintended negative linkages to the international control of nuclear 
power. Instead, framing the issue as a positive reinforcement of the non-proliferation 
regime will help to encourage dialogue from states that may be concerned about the 
potential loss of Article IV rights.   
Further research  
As evidenced by the variety of multilateral proposals, there is no single direction for the 
multilateral approach. Further research should investigate which style of approach 
would be most amenable to the states of most proliferation concern. Shared facilities 
may work better in regions with existing integrated cooperation; black-boxed 
technology, as used in the Russian IUEC, may be better where a single state already has 
the technology, and its neighbours are developing nuclear power. Alternatively, a 
holistic multilateral approach on new facilities may be more appropriate in Southeast 
Asia or South America, where states have some nuclear experience but lack the 
financial means to develop nuclear power programmes on their own. 
 
The major problem this norm will face in the struggle to become a salient norm has 
been shown in this thesis: developing states are concerned about what multilateral 
approaches will mean in terms of their ability to make decisions about their energy 
needs, without restriction or discrimination on their existing NPT rights. Thus, part of 
the immense task ahead in shoring up the nuclear non-proliferation regime is simply 
convincing developing states that adopting multilateral approaches is not an accusation 
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or an admittance of their potential guilt; it is merely an acknowledgement that, on more 
than one occasion, clandestine nuclear activities have gone under the radar of the 
existing non-proliferation system. Within the context of the history of the non-
proliferation regime, increasing levels of restriction on sensitive technologies is not out 
of character. Rather, it parallels an increasing recognition of the risks of proliferation 
posed by dual-use nuclear technologies, and the decreasing economic and technological 
barriers that lie between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. As such, multilateral 
approaches should be viewed as a method of encouraging non-proliferation and an 
incentive for NPT compliance rather than a mechanism for the denial of technology. 
The responses of new nuclear states and their decisions about the way that they engage 
in the nuclear field may ultimately determine whether multilateral approaches become 
the pervasive practice. Additionally, should this approach become the preferred method 
for existing nuclear states, those that do not accept it initially may find themselves 
subject to international normative pressures to do so. Further research on the attitudes 
of new (or soon-to-be) nuclear powered states will be particularly useful for reworking 
the proposals for multilateral fuel cycle initiatives. From a normative perspective, 
revisiting the response of a broad spectrum of states to the multilateral approach should 
be considered in the medium term. At this point, the indicators of a “tipping point” or 
“cascade” may be more discernable than at present.  
Conclusion 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is under an ever-increasing amount of strain. The 
longer the Iranian and North Korean nuclear situations remain unresolved, the more 
entrenched positions on both sides will become. The inability to resolve these issues 
will damage the credibility of the non-proliferation regime further. Thus, the outcome 
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of these crises has serious implications not only for the future of the regime, but also for 
wider international security dynamics, particularly in the Middle East and North Asia. 
As an increasing number of developing countries consider nuclear energy as a means to 
provide power to their growing populations, the concept of the multilateralisation of the 
nuclear fuel cycle could provide assurances to both sides of the nuclear divide: fuel 
supply guarantees and low proliferation risks. 
 
The foundations for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle already exist 
within the international system. European companies have collaborated on uranium 
enrichment for decades, and bilateral technical cooperation through the IAEA has 
provided many states with assistance in developing peaceful nuclear activities in a 
variety of fields. The critical point that those in support of this approach need to 
recognise is that states cannot be forced to buy-in; they must be encouraged. 
Technology denial will not prevent determined states from acquiring nuclear 
technology; yet it will simultaneously contribute to the resentment and sense of 
inequity that already plagues the regime.  
 
Controlling the spread of nuclear technology has been an ongoing measure taken 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the 1940s. Multilateral approaches to 
the nuclear cycle fuel can be seen as a part of that pattern. However, it is not just 
another small step in a long line of activities; it would be a major reconfiguration of the 
global nuclear energy framework. As such, the concerns raised by some developing 
states regarding their right to determine their own energy futures without discrimination 
are valid and need to be acknowledged and addressed by proponents. Multilateral 
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nuclear approaches could be the key component of broader efforts to prevent the 
collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the 21st century, creating greater 
security of fissile material, increasing the safety standards of nuclear facilities, and 
fostering trust and cooperation in the international system.  
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